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OSHA After Ten Years: A Review
and Some Proposed Reforms
Mark A. Rothstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
The human cost of a system that tolerates industrial accidents
and occupational disease is staggering. In the past thirty years
more American workers have died at workplaces than American
soldiers in any war. At least 14,500 workers die each year in indus-
trial accidents, and one worker in ten is injured.1 At least 100,000
workers die each year from occupational disease and at least
390,000 contract some form of occupationally-connected illness.2
The National Cancer Institute estimates that up to twenty percent
of all cancers are related to occupational and environmental
exposure.3
In the late 1960s the federal government finally responded to
growing concern from labor and community groups over dangerous
working conditions. In 1969 the Mine Enforcement Safety Admin-
istration and the Environmental Protection Agency were estab-
lished. The following year Congress passed the Occupational
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.A., University of Pittsburgh,
1970; J.D., Georgetown University, 1973. The author is indebted to Professor Douglas K.
Chapman of the University of Tulsa for his research on the feasibility of OSHA tax incen-
tives and to Arthur G. Sapper for his comments on adjudicative reforms. Peter Rich, J.D.
1980, assisted with the empirical research on adjudication.
1. According to the testimony of former Labor Secretary George Shultz, deaths and
injuries caused by industrial accidents annually result in the loss of 250 million employee
work days. The accidents and deaths cause over $1.5 billion in lost wages and result in an
annual loss to the nation's Gross National Product of $8 billion. In addition, the Public
Health Service estimates that there are 390,000 new cases of occupational disease each year.
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMITTEE ON LABOR AND PuBLic WELFARE (submitted to accom-
pany S. 2193), S. REP. No. 91-1281, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1970).
2. See THE PRswmr's REP oRT oN OccUPATIoNAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 111 (1972).
3. NATIONAL CANCER INsTxTuTE & NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF ENVioNmzNTAL HasTH Sci-
ENczs, EsTImATES OF THE FRACTION OF CANCER INCIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES ATrmuTA-
BLx To OCCUPATIONAL FACTORS (Draft Summary 1978). See also Ashford, The Magnitude of
the Occupational Health Problem, in SUncoum. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
AND PUnLiC WkAR & HousE Comm. ON EDUCATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROCEEmNS OF
THE INTEDEPARTmTAL TASK FORCE CONFERENCE ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES AND
WORKER'S COMPENSATION 295 (Jt. Comm. Print (1976)).
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Safety and Health Act.4 The Act created the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor,
and its research arm, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (now Health and Human Services). Congress was
convinced that the Act could effectively reduce the number of
work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses.
Despite such initial high hopes, OSHA has experienced
profound difficulties in the years since its inception. From the out-
set the Act's implementation has been hampered by underfunding,
poor administration, misdirected enforcement, and relentless as-
saults by critics. Moreover, since 1977, as the federal government
has moved to implement the goals of the Act more forcefully, the
criticism of OSHA has intensified. Serious questions regarding
OSHA's expense, effectiveness, and priorities have been raised and
have resulted in a variety of proposals to alter the basic structure
of the Act. In the Ninety-sixth Congress alone, forty-six bills were
introduced to amend OSHA,5 including six bills that would repeal
the Act.
This Article reviews the first ten years of rulemaking, enforce-
ment, and adjudication under the Act. The Article identifies vari-
ous problem areas that have developed in these activities and for
each area discusses whether past and present efforts to meet the
problems have been adequate. In light of the Act's troubled his-
tory, the Article suggests several amendments to the Act, as well as
administrative reforms, to facilitate the Act's implementation. The
Article does not, however, attempt to address all of the myriad le-
gal and policy issues or all of the Act's provisions that would bene-
fit from congressional redrafting. Instead, the Article is necessarily
limited to a discussion of broad policy developments and the es-
sential amendments and reforms needed to make the Act efficient
and effective.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). The Act was signed into law on December 29, 1970,
and took effect on April 28, 1971.
5. S. 251, 270, 625, 1112, 1170, 1486, 1572, 2153. H.R. 187, 372, 425, 426, 427, 428, 458,
553, 664, 738, 771, 794, 795, 826, 1018, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1379, 1855, 2116, 2310, 3032, 3132,





1. National Consensus Standards
Under section 6(a) of the Act" the Secretary of Labor was ini-
tially authorized to adopt, as the agency's own regulations gov-
erning workplace conditions, "national consensus standards"' and
"established federal standards" 8 without having first to comply
with the lengthy rulemaking procedures of either section 6(b)9 or
the Administrative Procedure Act.10 This special authority, which
expired after two years,11 was included in the Act to assure that
workers would be protected as soon as possible after the statute's
effective date.12 Because they were adopted without the burden of
rulemaking procedures, the standards did provide immediate cov-
erage to millions of employees across the nation. Unfortunately,
because the standards were adopted so quickly, they became the
source of numerous problems and legal controversies. This was es-
pecially true for the national consensus standards.
Most of the difficulties with national consensus standards can
be traced to the fact that they were privately adopted, optional
measures. s Many of the standards were poorly drafted, extremely
6. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1976) defines "national consensus standard" as follows:
The term "national consensus standard" means any occupational safety and health
standard or modification thereof which (1), has been adopted and promulgated by a
nationally recognized standards-producing organization under procedures whereby it
can be determined by the Secretary that persons interested and affected by the scope
of provisions of the standard have reached substantial agreement on its adoption, (2)
was formulated in a manner which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be
considered and (3) has been designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after con-
sultation with other appropriate Federal agencies.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 652(10) (1976) defines "established federal standard" as follows:
The term "established Federal standard" means any operative occupational safety
and health standard established by any agency of the United States and presently in
effect, or contained in any Act of Congress in force on December 29, 1970.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 665(b) (1976).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
11. For this reason these standards are often referred to as "interim standards." This
term, however, is misleading. Although the authority for adopting these standards was lim-
ited, the standards, once adopted, are permanent.
12. The purpose of this procedure is to establish as rapidly as possible national oc-
cupational safety and health standards with which industry is familiar. These stan-
dards may not be as effective or as up-to-date as is desirable, but they will be useful for
immediately providing a nationwide minimum level of health and safety.
S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
13. See Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of
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general, vague, redundant, contradictory, or hopelessly outdated.
The requirements were usually couched as specification stan-
dards1" rather than as more flexible performance standards.15
Other standards were advisory, directory, or precatory and were
never intended to be given binding effect.
In its haste to promulgate an initial standards package, OSHA
did not review the standards carefully."' Consequently, some of the
national consensus standards adopted under section 6(a) were triv-
ial, outdated, and even ludicrous. For example, two of the more
notorious standards adopted by OSHA were a prohibition on the
use of ice in drinking water17 and a requirement that all workplace
toilet seats be "open-front. '" 8 Although these and similar question-
able standards were not zealously enforced, they were the source of
embarrassment to OSHA and contributed greatly to the Agency's
developing image of over-enforcement of the Act and of
nitpicking. 9
In 1978 OSHA revoked 607 general industry standards and
321 special industry (vertical) standards covering barrelmaking,
bakery equipment, and laundry machinery and operations. 20 The
revoked standards were considered unnecessary or unrelated to oc-
cupational safety and health. Unfortunately, while this decision to
concentrate on "common-sense" priorities and to take other, simi-
Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TFx. L. REv. 1329 (1978);
Moran, Occupational Safety and Health Standards as Federal Law: The Hazards of Haste,
15 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 777 (1974); Morey, Mandatory Occupational Safety and Health
Standards-Some Legal Problems, 38 LAw & COMMP. PROB. 584 (1974).
14. E.g., Ladder rungs must be made of wood and must be one inch in diameter.
15. E.g., Ladder rungs must be capable of supporting 500 pounds.
16. On May 29, 1971, only a month and a day after the effective date of the Act,
OSHA published its initial standards package. 36 Fed. Reg. 10,466-714 (1971). This package
consisted of both national consensus standards-derived from the American National Stan-
dards Institute (ANSI) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)-and estab-
lished federal standards-based on the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976); Ser-
vice Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-357 (1976); Construction Safety Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-
333 (1976); National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-953
(1976); and Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1976).
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(b)(1)(iii) (1972), revised, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,932 (1973). The
standard was directed at the nineteenth century practice of obtaining and storing ice cut
from rivers and lakes that might be polluted.
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(c)(3)(iii) (1972), revised, 38 Fed. Reg. 10,933 (1973).
19. See McBride, The "National Consensus" Standards Were A Bad Mistake.. 87
AFL-CIO Am. FSDERATIONIT, July, 1980, at 5; Whiting, OSHA's Enforcement Policy, 31
LAB. L.J. 259, 261 (1980).
20. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,726 (1978). OSHA had originally proposed the revocation of 1100
standards. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,734 (1977).
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lar measures2 1 to simplify and improve OSHA standards was a
laudable effort by OSHA, the actions were too narrow in scope and
far too late.
2. Incorporation by Reference
Many standards included within the initial standards package
were not published in full but were "incorporated by reference" to
their original sources. The complete versions of these standards
may be examined at OSHA's national office and are obtainable
from the nearly two dozen private drafters, whose names and ad-
dresses appear in the pertinent standards.22 The practice of incor-
poration by reference has been upheld by the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission (Commission)23 and the Fourth
Circuit.24 Nevertheless, incorporation is a highly questionable pol-
icy that should be changed. All applicable OSHA regulations
should be published in a single source and should be official, free,
and readily available.25
3. Mandatory vs. Optional Standards
Administrative and judicial review of standards promulgated
under section 6(a) has raised several legal issues. In almost every
case the controversy evolved because a private, optional standard
was adopted as a government-enforced, mandatory requirement.26
For example, in Noblecraft Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of La-
bor, the employer argued that the omission of an explanatory
headnote contained in an American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) standard invalidated the Secretary's purported permanent
adoption of the standard. The Ninth Circuit rejected this conten-
21. See 44 Fed. Reg. 65,566 (1979).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.6(b) (1980). A complete list of all standards incorporated by ref-
erence and their private sources appears at 45 Fed. Reg. 44,090 (1980).
23. Ladish Co., 8 OSHC 1809, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 1 24,687; Charles A. Gaetano Con-
str. Corp., 6 OSHC 1463, [1978] OSHD (CCH) 1 22,630; Leader Evaporator Co., 4 OSHC
1292, [1976-1977] OSHD (CCH) 20,781 (1976).
24. Dunlop v. Ashworth, 538 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1976).
25. OSHA has recently given some indication that it may eliminate the ad hoc incor-
poration by reference of some standards. A proposed revision of the electrical standards for
general industry, for example, would end mandatory reference to the 250,000 word 1971
National Electrical Code and substitute a 15,000 word text. 44 Fed. Reg. 55,274 (1979).
26. The argument that the section 6(a) process of adopting ANSI standards was an
impermissible delegation of legislative and administrative authority to a private organiza-
tion was rejected in Noblecraft Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 614 F.2d 199, 203 (9th Cir.
1980).
27. 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980).
1981]
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tion, noting that the omitted language was "essentially a direction
to the enforcing agency that exemptions should be liberally
granted" 28 and as such was superfluous in light of section 6(d)'s
variance provision. 9
In attempting to give binding effect to previously-optional pri-
vate standards, the Secretary in some instances changed the word-
ing of the standard from "should" to "shall." In Usery v. Kenne-
cott Copper Corp.,30 however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
Commission's holding that the Secretary was not authorized by
section 6(a) to make such changes. Furthermore, the court in Mar-
shall v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co."1 held that the Secre-
tary's subsequent "interpretation" of an ANSI standard could not
change the effect of an already-adopted standard from advisory to
mandatory.
Together these holdings have created a dilemma for the Secre-
tary. Changing "should" to "shall" is impermissible, but adopting
the "should" wording makes the standard merely optional. This
means that to give binding effect to the many national consensus
standards containing "should" language, section 6(b) rulemaking
procedures would be required-a result directly contrary to the
purpose of section 6(a). Thus, in theory, the Secretary could argue
that because all national consensus standards were optional, sec-
tion 6(a) contains an implied grant of authority to promulgate the
standards as mandatory OSHA standards. This argument, how-
ever, is undermined by the Secretary's ill-advised statement in the
initial standards package that the adopted national consensus
standards "contain only mandatory provisions of the standards
promulgated by those two organizations [ANSI and NFPA]."3' 2
The obvious solution is a complete repromulgation of the sec-
tion 6(a) standards package in accordance with the notice and
comment requirements of section 6(b).33 This procedure would
28. Id. at 204.
29. See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW §§ 45-48
(1978).
30. 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977); accord, Marshall v. Union Oil Co., 616 F.2d 1113
(9th Cir. 1980).
31. 584 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1978); accord, Marshall v. Anaconda Co., 596 F.2d 370 (9th
Cir. 1979).
32. 36 Fed. Reg. 10,466 (1971). This suggests that ANSI standards in the "should"
form are not even optional, but were instead never intended to be adopted by OSHA at all.
33. It may be theorized that the Secretary has declined to repromulgate the § 6(a)
standards for two reasons. First, the Secretary may believe that even if the standards con-
tain some flaws, they are valid and enforceable notwithstanding some contrary judicial opin-
ions. Second, the Secretary may prefer to suffer an occasional defeat in a single case than to
[Vol. 34:71
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eliminate the problems created by the mandatory-advisory distinc-
tion. In addition, new standards could resolve other controversial
issues, such as the meaning of certain words3 4 and the frequently
asserted vagueness of standards.3 5
B. Health Standards
1. Development
Although the initial standards package contained mostly
safety standards, OSHA also adopted threshold limit values
(TLV's)36 for 400 toxic substances. These TLV's were developed by
the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists, a
private organization, and adopted as federal standards in 1969 pur-
suant to the Walsh-Healey Act.3 7 The standards were inadequate,
however, and an urgent need existed for scientific research and the
promulgation of new health standards to prevent the estimated
100,000 deaths annually caused by occupational diseases.38
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) was established by section 22 of the Act39 to research and
develop recommended OSHA standards. 40 Because an estimated
open up the entire standards package to wholesale substantive attacks. If this conjecture is
true, the wisdom of engaging in such an administrative "holding action" may be questioned
because the present standards would still be enforceable during the promulgation period of
the new standards. OSHA's current approach, according to OSHA Safety Standards Direc-
tor Jerry Purswell, is to review entire subparts of standards. [1980] 10 Occup. SAFETY &
HILTH REP. (BNA) 5.
34. For example, defining the word "provide," used in many standards, has been par-
ticularly controversial. Compare Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir.
1977) ("provide" does not mean "require use of" personal protective equipment), with Mar-
shall v. Southwestern Indus. Contractors & Riggers, Inc., 576 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1978) ("pro-
vide" does mean "require use of"). An employer's obligation to "provide" safety equipment
has been generally read as not requiring the employer to bear the cost. Budd Co. v. OSHRC,
513 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1975) (safety shoes).
35. Compare Cotter & Co. v. OSHRC, 598 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1979), and B & B Insula-
tion, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978), with General Dynamics Corp. v.
OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1979), and S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc., 7 OSHC 1260,
[1979] OSHD (CCH) 1 23,480.
36. A threshold limit value (TLV) represents the maximum time-weighted average
concentration to which a healthy worker may be exposed for a normal 40-hour work week
up to eight hours a day over a working lifetime (40-50 years) without becoming ill. N.
TRUEFF, ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH 221 (1980).
37. 34 Fed. Reg. 7946 (1969).
38. THE PREsInENT's REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, 1972, at 111
(1972).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1976).
40. NIOSH was established in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(now the Department of Health and Human Services). As the successor to the Bureau of
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25,000 toxic substances are used or generated by American busi-
ness and industry, including 500 to 600 new substances each year, 1
NIOSH needed to take action immediately. Unfortunately, NIOSH
was understaffed, underbudgeted, and ineffective in developing
health standards.42 In its first three and one-half years of operation
NIOSH produced only eighteen criteria documents with standards
recommendations. 3
The Labor Department must share the blame with NIOSH for
slow health standards development. In the Act's first five years,
OSHA promulgated permanent health standards only three times,
issuing regulations covering asbestos, vinyl chloride, and fourteen
separate carcinogens. Furthermore, these standards were promul-
gated in response to private petitions for emergency temporary
standards rather than through the procedures of section 6(b).
Much of the fault for the initial delay in promulgating health stan-
dards has been attributed to OSHA's so-called "22 milestones,""
the agency's detailed procedures for standard development.45
Other structural problems, however, continue to prevent OSHA
from responding promptly to the need for new health standards.
One of the greatest criticisms of the OSHA standard issuance pro-
cess is that it simply takes too long. For example, when a district
court in National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens v. Mar-
shall46 ordered OSHA to submit a timetable for developing a field
sanitation standard, the agency replied that a period of fifty-four
months would be necessary.'
Recent efforts at promulgating health standards also have
been delayed by the sheer volume of the testimonial and other evi-
dence introduced into hearing records. Although by statute OSHA
rulemaking is "notice and comment" informal rulemaking,48 OSHA
Occupational Safety and Health (BOSH), NIOSH assumed a tradition of extreme ineffec-
tiveness. See J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BrrrSR WAGES 88-94 (1973).
41. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE: SLOW PROGRESS LIKELY IN DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS FOR Toxic SUB-
STANCES AND HARMFUL PHYSICAL AGENTS FOUND IN WORKPLACES 16 (1973).
42. See Page & Munsing, Occupational Health and the Federal Government: The
Wages Are Still Bitter, 38 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 651, 654-57 (1974).
43. Id. at 655-56.
44. See Boyd, Dispelling the Standard Myths, TRIAL, Oct. 1975, at 13, 21.
45. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, 1974, at 10-11
(1976).
46. 626 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (remanding to district court).
47. [1980] OSHD (CCH) 24,542.
48. The standard of review prescribed by § 6(f), however, is "substantial evidence,"
which is generally used in adjudicatory proceedings or formal rulemaking. See Note, Judi-
[Vol. 34:71
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has issued regulations providing for hearings before an administra-
tive law judge (ALJ); interested parties have the right to submit
written comments, to testify in person, and to conduct cross-exam-
ination.49 The comments, exhibits, and testimony that must be re-
viewed have often reached massive and time-consuming
proportions."
Since 1976 OSHA has made some progress in promulgating
important new health standards. Standards that seek to limit ex-
posure to lead, benzene, coke oven emissions, arsenic, and cotton
dust have been promulgated. In 1980 OSHA promulgated a long-
awaited standard concerning the identification, classification, and
regulation of occupational carcinogens." This "generic carcinogen
standard" seeks to provide the framework for dealing with the esti-
mated 500 cancer causing substances found in American
workplaces.2
2. Judicial Review
Each new health standard has industry-wide impact, carries
with it millions of dollars in compliance costs, and involves impor-
tant matters of employee health. Consequently, virtually all of
OSHA's new health standards have been challenged in the federal
courts of appeals" pursuant to section 6(f) of the Act." The cases
cial Review Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: The Substantial Evidence
Test as Applied to Informal Rulemaking, 1974 DuKa L.J. 459.
49. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1911.1-1911.18 (1980). The effect of these regulations is to create a
"hybrid" form of rulemaking.
50. For example, the record in the cotton dust case exceeded 105,000 pages, AFL-CIO
v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. American Textile
Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Marshall, 101 S. Ct. 68 (1980), and the record in the generic carcinogen
standard exceeded 250,000 pages. Shabecoff, First Uniform U.S. Rules Set Up to Reduce
Cancer in Workplace, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 1. In light of the Supreme
Court's decision in the benzene case, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980), requiring greater evidence of the benefits expected of the
proposed standard, lengthy hearing records are likely to continue. See notes 89-90 infra and
accompanying text.
51. 45 Fed. Reg. 5002-296 (1980).
52. Whereas OSHA promulgated only 20 carcinogen standards in the Act's first nine
years, OSHA head Eula Bingham is optimistic that, as a result of the new rulemaking initia-
tive, ten new carcinogens can be regulated each year. Shabecoff, supra note 50.
53. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
2844 (1980) (benzene); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. granted sub nom. Republic Steel Co. v. OSHA, 100 S. Ct. 3054, cert. dismissed, 101 S.
Ct. 38 (1980) (coke oven emissions); AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
cert. granted sub noam. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 101 S. Ct. 68 (1980) (cotton
dust); Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 599 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.
1979) (hyperbaric diving); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.
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often involve difficult and complex issues of scientific evidence,
regulatory policy, and economic impact.
The most recent, and perhaps most controversial, case involv-
ing an OSHA health standard was Industrial Union Department,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (API) 5 In API the
Supreme Court, hearing a standards case for the first time, ad-
dressed the validity of OSHA's benzene standard. The Fifth Cir-
cuit had invalidated the standard because OSHA failed to provide
a quantitative estimate of the benefits flowing from a reduction in
the permissible exposure limit.56
The Fifth Circuit based its decision on its construction of an
obscure definitional section of the Act, section 3(8), 57 which pro-
vides: "The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means
a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one
or more practices, means, methods, operations or processes, rea-
sonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful em-
ployment and places of employment." The court held that, in light
of the requirement that standards be "reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate," the Secretary must determine "whether the benefits
expected from the standard bear a reasonable relationship to the
costs imposed by the standard."58 The court was, essentially, fash-
ioning a three-part test: (1) whether substantial evidence supports
the Secretary's estimate of expected benefits; (2) whether substan-
tial evidence supports the Secretary's estimate of expected costs;
and (3) whether the benefits bear a reasonable relationship to the
costs.
While requiring a relationship between costs and benefits, the
Fifth Circuit stopped short of requiring "an elaborate cost-benefit
analysis." '59 According to the court, the cost-benefit question does
not even arise unless the Secretary has presented substantial evi-
dence of a standard's expected benefits and costs. Thus, because
1975) (vinyl chloride); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (asbestos); Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120
(5th Cir. 1974) (organophosphorous pesticides); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973) (14 carcinogens).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976).
55. 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
56. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 1978).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
58. 581 F.2d at 503. The court relied on its previous construction in Aqua Slide 'N'
Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978), of similar lan-
guage in the Consumer Product Safety Act.
59. 581 F.2d at 503.
[Vol. 34:71
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there was inadequate evidence of expected benefits, 0 the cost-ben-
efit question was not reached by the court.
On July 2, 1980, the last day of its 1979-1980 Term, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court was
sharply divided, and five separate opinions were issued by the Jus-
tices. Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of four Justices," re-
jected the government's argument that section 3(8) is meaningless
and is overshadowed by section 6(b)(5),as the section of the Act
that specifically details the requirements for standards dealing
with toxic materials or harmful physical agents.63
In so ruling, Justice Stevens found it unnecessary to address
the much-debated language of section 6(b)(5), which requires the
Secretary to promulgate standards that will protect the employee's
health "to the extent feasible." It is from this language that the
feasibility and cost-benefit analysis controvery arises. According to
Justice Stevens, the requirements of section 3(8) must be met
before any consideration of section 6(b)(5) can occur. In Justice
Stevens' view,
[Section 3(8)] requires the Secretary, before issuing any standard, to deter-
mine that it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant
risk of material health impairment. Only after the Secretary has made the
threshold determination that such a risk exists with respect to a toxic sub-
stance, would it be necessary to decide whether § 6(b)(5) requires him to se-
lect the most protective standard he can consistent with economic and tech-
nological feasibility, or whether, as respondents argue, the benefits of the
regulation must be commensurate with the costs of its implementation."
60. There was no serious dispute over the estimate of the costs.
61. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined in the plurality opinion and Jus-
tice Powell joined in all parts of the plurality opinion but part HI-D.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
63. Section 6(b)(5) provides as follows:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period
of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be based
upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be
appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety
protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific
data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and
other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall be
expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired.
64. 100 S. Ct. at 2863 (emphasis added). The Court incorrectly paraphrased § 3(8) as
requiring a standard to be "reasonably necessary and appropriate." Actually, a standard
need only be "reasonably necessary or appropriate." See text accompanying note 57 supra.
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By this holding, the plurality opinion in effect added a fourth ele-
ment to the Fifth Circuit's test6 6 that had to be satisfied before the
other three questions could even be raised. In order to show that
the new standard was "reasonably necessary or appropriate," the
Secretary had to prove that the present permissible exposure limit,
10 p.p.m., inadequately protected workers: "[T]he burden was on
the Agency to show, on the basis of substantial evidence, that it is
at least more likely than not that long-term exposure to 10 ppm of
benzene presents a significant risk of material impairment." 6 Of
great importance is Justice Stevens' statement that the Act "was
not designed to require employers to provide absolutely risk-free
workplaces," but was only intended to require "the elimination, as
far as feasible, of significant risks of harm. '6 7 Thus, the new ben-
zene standard could not be justified merely because some risks ex-
ist at present levels.
In affirming the Fifth Circuit, the plurality opinion found that
the Secretary had failed to prove that there are significant risks of
benzene exposure at the levels of the present standard. In so find-
ing, the Court rejected the Secretary's theory that there is no abso-
lutely safe level for a carcinogen and that the industry has the bur-
den of showing that there is a safe exposure level.6 8 This part of
the opinion casts great doubt on the validity of OSHA's generic
carcinogen policy, which is based on the theory that there is no
safe level for a carcinogen.69
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion focused on the lack
of evidence in the record to support the new standard. The Chief
Justice emphasized that "[w]hen the administrative record reveals
only scant or minimal risk of material health impairment, respon-
65. The Court, of course, neither adopted the Fifth Circuit's analysis-which has been
characterized as being comprised of three parts, see note 58 supra and accompanying
text-nor suggested that the problem should be analyzed in these terms.
66. 100 S. Ct. at 2869.
67. Id. at 2864. See generally So It's a Carcinogen, But How Bad?, N.Y. Times, July 9,
1980, § A, at 18, col. 1.
68. OSHA argued that, because of a lack of available scientific evidence, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the exposed employee. To do otherwise, the agency reasoned,
would require waiting for leukemia deaths (caused by benzene) to justify the standard. 100
S. Ct. at 2869.
69. Justice Stevens sought to ameliorate the seemingly harsh effects of the plurality
opinion by indicating that (1) as long as it can be shown that a workplace is unsafe, "signifi-
cant risk" need not be calculated with mathematical precision; (2) a "significant risk" can be
shown by using the "best available evidence" and need not wait for scientific certainty, and
(3) as demonstrated by other decisions, other ways exist to prove the significance of risks.
100 S. Ct. at 2871. One example given by the Court of an acceptable quantification of risk is
the coke oven emissions standard. Id. at 2871-72 n.64. See note 96 infra.
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sible administration calls for avoidance of extravagant, comprehen-
sive regulation.17 0
Justice Powell concurred in part and in the judgment. Al-
though he regarded the question as close, he joined with the plu-
rality in concluding that the Secretary had failed to prove that the
standard was "reasonably necessary." Perhaps as a concession to
the closeness of the facts, he then analyzed the economic feasibility
of the standard based on the assumption that the Secretary had
proved the need for the standard. Although following the analyti-
cal framework of the plurality, Justice Powell went beyond that
opinion by interpreting the "feasible" language of section 6(b)(5)
as mandating OSHA to consider whether the benzene standard's
"substantial costs" are justified. According to Justice Powell,
OSHA had simply concluded that the costs were justified but had
failed to explain or document the method by which such a conclu-
sion was reached. Justice Powell's concurrence is thus important
because his analysis goes farther than that of both the Court plu-
rality and the Fifth Circuit by requiring cost-justification not only
as a matter of theory but also as the basis for invalidating a
standard.
Justice Rehnquist merely concurred in the judgment. In a sep-
arate opinion he initially rejected the plurality's position "that §
3(8) acts as a general check upon the Secretary's duty under §
6(b)(5) to adopt the most protective standard feasible. 7 1 Having
dispensed with the "threshold" problem, Justice Rehnquist then
turned directly to section 6(b)(5), arguing that the section's stan-
dard of "feasibility" renders meaningful judicial review impossi-
ble.7 . Justice Rehnquist contended that Congress, by failing to pro-
vide the Secretary with adequate parameters for regulation, had
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the executive.
No other opinion provided a detailed analysis of the delegation is-
sue, however, and even Justice Rehnquist admitted that the doc-
trine had fallen into "desuetude. ''7 3
Justice Marshall's somewhat strident dissent was joined in by
70. 100 S. Ct. at 2875 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
71. Id. at 2883 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2886. Justice Rehnquist would invalidate the first sentence of § 6(b)(5) as it
applies to any toxic substance or harmful physical agent for which a safe level is unknown or
otherwise infeasible, but not as to toxic substances or harmful physical agents for which safe
levels are feasible. Id. at 2887 & n.8. It is not clear how this limitation eliminates the prob-
lem of defining what is "feasible." Justice Rehnquist's argument was rejected by the dissent.
Id. at 2902 n.30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justices Brennan, White, and Blackmun. The dissent accused the
plurality of ignoring the plain meaning of the Act "in order to
bring the authority of the Secretary of Labor in line with the plu-
rality's own views of proper regulatory policy. 17 4 According to the
dissent, the plurality, by fashioning a restrictive rule of law from
the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language, "placed the
burden of medical uncertainty squarely on the shoulders of the
American worker, the intended beneficiary of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act."'7 5 Justice Marshall also criticized the plu-
rality for reevaluating the complex scientific evidence presented to
the agency without giving deference to the findings of the Secre-
tary.76 In addition, the dissent rejected the industry's argument
that the "feasible" language in section 6(b)(5) requires an elabo-
rate cost-benefit analysis; the dissent interpreted "feasible" as
mandating only that standards be economically and technologically
achievable.7
It is important to note that the plurality's view on the effect of
section 3(8) is a minority view of the Court. Justice Rehnquist
joined with the four dissenters in concluding that section 3(8) was
not intended to have the significance attributed to it by the plural-
ity.7 8 Justice Powell's concurrence conceded that the sufficiency of
the evidence justifying a new standard was a close question.79 On
both points, the plurality view may be criticized. With regard to
section 3(8), as the dissent points out, "reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate" clauses are common in regulatory statutes, and they
have never been read "as having a substantive content that super-
sedes a specific congressional directive embodied in a provision
that is focused more particularly on an agency's authority."80 In
74. Id. at 2887.
75. Id. at 2888.
76. Id. at 2890.
77. Id. at 2902.
78. As Justice Rehnquist stated: "I therefore find it difficult to accept the conclusion
of the lower court, as embellished by respondents, that § 3(8) acts as a general check upon
the Secretary's duty under § 6(b)(5) to adopt the most protective standard feasible." Id. at
2883.
79. Id. at 2877.
80. Id. at 2897 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Consumer Product Safety Act provision,
the construction of which in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569
F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978), was applied to OSHA by the Fifth Circuit in American Petroleum
Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't. AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980), is substantially different from
§ 3(8). The text of 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(A) provides:
(2) The Commission shall not promulgate a consumer product safety rule unless
it finds (and includes such finding in the rule)-
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fact, similar language is used in other sections of the Act with an
apparently benign intent.8 1
The congressional intent behind section 3(8) may be easier to
discern if that section is read in the context of other similar provi-
sions in the Act.82 Section 6(a)83 authorizes the Secretary to adopt
national consensus standards and established federal standards
"unless he determines that the promulgation of such standard
would not result in improved safety or health for specifically desig-
nated employees." Section 9(a)" authorizes the Secretary to issue
a "notice in lieu of a citation with respect to de minimis violations
which have no direct or immediate relationship to safety or
health." Section 24(a) 5 authorizes the Secretary to compile statis-
tics of injuries and illnesses "other than minor injuries requiring
only first aid treatment. . . ." Read in light of these other sections,
it appears that section 3(8) is merely a general definitional section.
The provision provides only that OSHA standards must be related
to the purposes of the Act and may not be concerned solely with
efficiency, productivity, convenience, aesthetics, or trivial matters.
A final criticism of the plurality's use of section 3(8) is that
the plurality misreads and misquotes the section as having been
written in the conjunctive rather than in the disjunctive s6 Section
3(8) requires that a standard be "reasonably necessary or appropri-
ate." The plurality, like the Fifth Circuit, seems to have focused
unduly on whether a standard is necessary rather than whether it
is appropriate. The common definition of appropriate is "especially
suitable, compatible, or fitting. '87 Certainly, it is especially suita-
ble, compatible, and fitting for OSHA to regulate worker exposure
to benzene. The determination of whether the standard as promul-
(A) that the rule (including its effective date) is reasonably necessary to eliminate
or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product.
81. For example, § 8(c)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.c. §
657(c)(1) (1975), authorizes the Secretary to require employers to make, keep, preserve, and
make available certain records "as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of this
Act. . . ." Section 28(a) of the Act authorizes the Small Business Administration to make
such loans as it "may determine to be necessary or appropriate to assist any small business
concern" in complying with the Act.
82. As the dissent observes, § 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act re-
ceived extensive legislative attention, but § 3(8)-a supposedly crucial limitation on §
6(b)(5)-received none at all. 100 S. Ct. at 2898 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976).
84. Id. § 658(a).
85. Id. § 673(a).
86. See 100 S. Ct. at 2862, 2863.
87. WEsSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTONARY 56 (1974).
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gated is valid should have been based on sections 6(b)(5) and
6(f).88
With respect to the plurality's analysis of the evidentiary sup-
port for the benzene standard, it must be remembered that the
case involved a record containing fifty volumes of testimony deal-
ing with complex and unsettled scientific issues. The plurality em-
phasized what it termed OSHA's "inadequate" rejection of indus-
try testimony that a dose-response curve could be formulated on
the basis of current epidemiological data and that current exposure
levels would cause at most two deaths every six years.89 The plural-
ity failed to acknowledge, however, the admission by an industry
witness that the promising figures were based on a "lousy set of
data" and consequently were only "slightly better than a guess."'"
More importantly, section 6(f) provides that on judicial review
"[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a
whole." The substantial evidence rule does not require that an
agency provide a detailed refutation of every adverse witness who
testifies in a rulemaking proceeding. Such a burden would be im-
possible to meet and would ignore the requirement that the record
be considered "as a whole."
It is ironic that the benzene case could be precedent set-
ting, because the regulation of benzene raises issues somewhat
atypical from the control of other toxic substances and carcin-
ogens. The number of employees that would benefit from the
new regulation is relatively small-35,000.91 Benzene-induced leu-
kemia has a relatively low incidence rate92 and a long latency
88. It is beyond the scope of this Article to set forth an elaborate framework for analy-
sis of standards under § 6(b)(5) and § 6(f) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See
generally Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic
Substances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285 (1976);
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science
Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729 (1979);
Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis for Standards Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 60 B.U. L. Rav.
115 (1980).
89. 100 S. Ct. at 2870.
90. Id. at 2894 n.23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2899 & n.28. By contrast, the cotton dust standard affects between 250,000
and 800,000 employees. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 646 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. granted sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 101 S. Ct. 68 (1980).
92. Although benzene exposure may increase an individual's likelihood of contracting
leukemia, the incidence of leukemia among exposed workers is only thirteen per 100,000.
See 100 S. Ct. at 2852-53 & nn.9 & 12. By contrast, as many as 20-30% of cotton workers
suffer from byssinosis. 617 F.2d at 646 & nn.17 & 20.
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period.9 3 Moreover, there is relatively little epidemiological or labo-
ratory data concerning exposure to the chemical," and the ex-
pected benefits of a sharp reduction in the permissible exposure
limit are difficult to quantify." The benzene decision is certainly
important, but the uniqueness of the facts, the divisiveness of the
Court, and the narrowness of the holding may be limiting factors.98
C. Judicial Review
1. Venue Reform
Section 6(f) of the Act"' provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under
this section may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is
promulgated file a petition challenging the validity of such standard with the
United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or
has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of such standard.
Although permitting judicial review of OSHA standards in the
court of appeals for the circuit in which the filing party "resides or
has his principal place of business" appears simple and fair, two
related procedural problems have arisen.
The first problem under section 6(f) judicial review involves
93. The latency period for benzene-induced leukemia could range from two to over 20
years. 100 S. Ct. at 2893 (Marshall, J., dissenting). By contrast, damage from chronic lead
exposure may be "sudden." See 44 Fed. Reg. 60,980 (1979) (Appendix A to lead standard, 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1980)).
94. 100 S. Ct. at 2859 & n.35, 2894 & n.23 (Marshall, J., dissenting). By contrast, there
is much better data on the effect of vinyl chloride and other substances. See id. at 2871-72
n.64.
95. Id. at 2862.
96. On the same day that it issued its decision in the "benzene case," the Court
granted certiorari in a case challenging the validity of the coke oven emissions standard.
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom.
Republic Steel Corp. v. OSHA, 100 S. Ct. 3054 (1980). Because the need for a new coke oven
emissions standard was adequately demonstrated, see note 69 supra, this case promised to
resolve the issue of cost-benefit analysis. On August 26, 1980, however, the industry peti-
tioners moved to dismiss their previously-granted petition, and on September 10, 1980, the
Court granted the motion. 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980). Subsequently, the Court agreed to rule on
the issue of the economic impact of OSHA standards when it granted certiorari in the "cot-
ton dust" case. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub noam.
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Marshall, 101 S. Ct. 68 (1980).
In United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 8 OSHC 1810 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980), a case
decided after the "benzene case," the D.C. Circuit upheld the lead standard as applied to
the primary and secondary lead smelting industries and the battery manufacturing industry.
According to the court, the Secretary must construct a reasonable estimate of compliance
costs and must demonstrate the reasonable likelihood that these costs will not threaten the
existence or competitive structure of an industry. Id. at 1864.
97. 29 U.S.C. § 655(0 (1976).
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"forum shopping." In this context, "forum shopping" does not in-
volve the choice of a circuit based simply on residence or place of
business.98 Instead, because judicial review is usually sought by
trade associations and groups of employers or employees that can
be said to "reside" in a number of circuits, "forum shopping" more
specifically entails the selection of a circuit that is deemed to be a
favorable forum."
The second, related problem concerns the so-called "race to
the courthouse" that invariably occurs whenever there are two or
more "adversely affected persons" seeking review in different
courts of appeals.100 Section 2112(a) of title 28 of the United States
Code, which is specifically referred to in section 11(a) of the Act,
provides, in part:.
If proceedings have been instituted in two or more courts of appeals with
respect to the same order the agency, board, commission, or officer concerned
shall file the record in that one of such courts in which a proceeding with
respect to such order was first instituted. The other courts in which such
proceedings are pending shall thereupon transfer them to the court of ap-
peals in which the record has been filed. For the convenience of the parties in
the interest of justice such court may thereafter transfer all the proceedings
with respect to such order to any other court of appeals. 101
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Bingham demon-
98. Pursuant to § 11(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a)
(1976), any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order of the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission may obtain judicial review in the United States court of
appeals for the circuit in which the violation is alleged to have occurred, the circuit in which
the employer has its principal office, or in the D.C. Circuit. The statistical variations in
relief granted by the courts in § 11(a) judicial review cases may account for some degree of
"forum shopping" as well. See Rothstein, Judicial Review of Decisions of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission-1973-1978: An Empirical Study, 56 CHI.-KErr L.
Rzv. 607, 627-30 (1980). Nevertheless, the "race to the courthouse" problem that exists
under § 6(f) has not been troublesome under § 11(a) because there is usually only one ag-
grieved person in a § 11(a) adjudication.
99. Because most of this expensive appellate litigation is undertaken by industry trade
associations and union groups, their interests would necessarily be an important factor in
venue reform.
100. To date, these "races" have been contested by both industry and union petition-
ers. Presumably, any new rulemaking action under § 6(b) of the Act, except for revocation
or modification of existing standards would "adversely affect" an industry petitioner. A
union petitioner may or may not support a new standard. Nevertheless, even when unions
are satisfied with a new standard, a "protective" challenge urging judicial approval can be
filed in a hospitable circuit. No court has yet considered the issue of whether such a peti-
tioner has standing under § 11(a). See generally 68 COLUM. L. REv. 166, 170 (1968).
101. This general venue provision for judicial review of administrative matters has cre-
ated "race to the courthouse" problems under a variety of statutes. See Note, Venue for
Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: A New Approach, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1735, 1742-
44 (1980).
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strated the procedural complications that arise from multiple
filings.102 OSHA had held a conference with various invited labor
and industry leaders on April 29, 1977, at which time the benzene
standard was signed. Immediately after the meeting, the AFL-CIO
filed a petition for review with the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Less than an hour later, after a press confer-
ence, OSHA filed the standard with the Federal Register. The
standard was published in the Federal Register on May 3, 1977,
and on May 10, 1977, the American Petroleum Institute fied a pe-
tition for review in the Fifth Circuit. On June 7, 1977, the Fifth
Circuit transferred that proceeding to the D.C. Circuit, the court of
first filing, pursuant to section 2112(a). Immediately thereafter the
American Petroleum Institute filed a motion to retransfer the en-
tire case to the Fifth Circuit.
In a divided opinion, the D.C. Circuit held that in the absence
of any OSHA regulation the standard was "issued" when it was
signed at the private conference. Therefore, the AFL-CIO petition
was considered timely fied in the D.C. Circuit. Nevertheless, "in
the interest of justice," the court ordered the case retransferred to
the Fifth Circuit, where "the first petition was filed subsequent to
the disclosure of the agency decision to the general public. 103
After the decision in Industrial Union Department, OSHA
promulgated a regulation that indicated that standards are "is-
sued" when they are filed with the Federal Register.1°4 Although
the regulation gave all parties the same starting time, it did not
end the "race to the courthouse." Indeed, even with a uniform
starting time, problems of varying sorts have arisen. For example,
in American Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA 05 a conflict devel-
oped involving two challenges to OSHA's lead standard. When
OSHA "issued" its standard on November 13, 1978, the Steelwork-
ers immediately fied a petition for judicial review in the Third
Circuit at 8:45 a.m. EST. At precisely the same time, 7:45 a.m.
CST, the Lead Industries Association filed a petition in the Fifth
102. 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
103. Id. at 972. Judge Leventhal's opinion was the consensus of the panel. Judge
Wilkey concurred in the result, but asserted that a standard should not be considered issued
until it has been disclosed to the public. Therefore, he believed that the AFL-CIO petition
was premature. Id. at 973. Judge Fahy agreed with Judge Leventhal that the AFL-CIO peti-
tion was filed in a timely fashion but asserted that the D.C. Circuit was a more convenient
forum and should retain jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 979.
104. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,166 (1977).
105. 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979).
1981]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:71
Circuit.106 In ruling on the venue question, 107 the Third Circuit re-
fused to go beyond the official notations of the time of filing to
determine if one petition had been fied seconds before the other
petition.108 The court declared that "unlike race tracks,.. . courts
are not equipped with photoelectric timers, and we decline the in-
vitation to speculate which nose would show as first in a photo
finish."' 09 The court then ordered that the proceedings be trans-
ferred to the D.C. Circuit, which was deemed "obviously a conve-
nient forum" 0 because a petition to review an EPA lead standard
had recently been filed by the industry in that court.','
Forum shopping and races to the courthouse are problems
that exist under other statutes as well," 2 but recent OSHA cases
have called attention to the magnitude of the problem."81 These
106. The union considered the Third Circuit a more hospitable forum because of its
recent decision upholding the coke oven emissions standards. See American Iron & Steel
Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Republic Steel Corp. v.
OSHA, 100 S. Ct. 3054, cert. dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 38 (1980). The industry considered the
Fifth Circuit a more hospitable forum because of its recent decision invalidating the ben-
zene standard. See American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), affd
sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844
(1980).
107. Following the procedure adopted by the D.C. Circuit in American Public Gas
Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the Third and Fifth Circuits conferred on the
matter and the Fifth Circuit agreed to defer to the Third Circuit's determination of the
proper forum. 592 F.2d at 695.
108. The industry claimed that its petition was filed ten seconds earlier. Id.; [1978] 8
Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1156.
109. 592 F.2d at 695.
110. Id. at 698. The Labor Department and counsel for the union were located in
Washington, while the industry counsel was in New York City.
111. This justification for transfer may be questioned, however. As the court observes,
id. at 697-98, the petitioners had no choice of forum under the Clean Air Act. Moreover, it is
unlikely that both the legal issues and judicial panels in the two cases would be the same.
112. See generally Haworth, Modest Proposals to Smooth the Track for the Race to
the Court House, 48 GEo. WASH. L. Rzv. 211 (1980); Note, supra note 101.
113. When OSHA promulgated its "generic carcinogen standard," 45 Fed. Reg. 5002
(1980), it was not clear when the standard was "issued" and whether it was a "regulation" to
be challenged in district court or a "standard" to be challenged in the court of appeals
pursuant to § 6(f) of the Act. Consequently, the American Industrial Health Council filed
simultaneous challenges in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas and the Fifth Circuit. In American Indus. Health Council v. Marshall, 494 F. Supp.
941 (S.D. Tex. 1980), the court, defining the generic carcinogen standard as an occupational
safety and health standard under § 3(8) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976), held that the
regulation was not reviewable in district court. Cf. Louisiana Chem. As'n v. Bingham, 8
OSHC 1950, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 124,803 (W.D. La.) (OSHA's Access to Employee Expo-
sure and Medical Records standard not reviewable in district court). In American Petroleum
Inst. v. OSHA, 8 OSHC 2025, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 124,779 (5th Cir.), the Fifth Circuit held
that it, rather than the D.C., Third, or Seventh Circuits, was the proper forum for review of
the generic carcinogen standard, because only the Fifth Circuit could rule on the appeal
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regrettable practices will continue until section 2112(a) is
amended. Congressional action is essential to preserve the integrity
of the judiciary and to ensure that judicial review is consistent and
knowledgeable.
The simplest solution would be to amend section 2112(a) to
provide that when timely and valid petitions are filed in any two or
more circuits, venue will lie in the D.C. Circuit.""' The proceedings
could be transferred to circuits other than the D.C. Circuit upon a
showing that one party would be inconvenienced or that the inter-
ests of justice would thereby be served.1 This proposal would not
only eliminate forum shopping and races to the courthouse, but
would also satisfy other concerns: (1) it would allow cases involving
purely local interests to be decided in the circuit of those interests;
(2) it would enable the D.C. Circuit to develop an expertise and a
consistency in deciding the validity of administrative action that
involves matters of national concern;e 6 (3) it would make the deter-
mination of venue predictable and logical;1 17 and (4) it would not
from the district court's dismissal of the challenge. The opposite result, however, was
reached by the same court in Louisiana Chem. Ass'n v. Bingham, No. 80-3850 (5th Cir.
Sept. 4, 1980). In that case, the Fifth Circuit transferred the Access to Employee Exposure
and Medical Records standard challenge to the D.C. Circuit, despite the pending appeal of
the dismissal of an action brought in a Louisiana district court.
114. Congress has already made the D.C. Circuit the exclusive forum for certain ac-
tions of the Department of Energy, 15 U.S.C. § 766(c) (Supp. I 1977) (regulations of "gen-
eral and national applicability"); the Environmental Protection Agency, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-
7(a)(1) (1976) (drinking water), § 4915(a) (1976) (noise), § 6976(1) (1976) (solid waste dispo-
sal), and § 7607(b)(1) (Supp. I 1977) (air pollution); the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1976) (licensing decisions); the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(3)
(1976) (declaratory judgments about interests on governmental obligations); and the Mine
Safety and Health Administration, 30 U.S.C. § 953(d) (Supp. I 1977) (grants to states).
115. The Administrative Conference of the United States has issued a draft recom-
mendation proposing that the Administrative Office of the United States Court determine
venue when, within ten days of an agency action, two or more circuits are petitioned. The
Administrative Office would select venue from the courts petitioned according to a "scheme
of non-periodic rotation," so that no party could predict the forum for a particular chal-
lenge. The existing power of the courts to transfer a case for the convenience of the parties
would not be affected. See 45 Fed. Reg. 61,636 (1980).
Another suggestion is to amend 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) to create a judicial clearinghouse
similar to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which would receive all petitions
and then assign cases to the circuit deemed to have the greatest expertise in that particular
area. See Note, supra note 101, at 1757-59.
Still another recent proposal would make minor changes in 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) that
would provide clearer guidelines for the transfer of cases to the most convenient forum. See
Haworth, supra note 112, at 213.
116. See Note, supra note 101.
117. Admittedly, this proposal provides the second party filing a petition a degree of
control over the selection of a forum. That party would be able to change the forum to the
D.C. Circuit simply by filing a petition in any other circuit. On the other hand, making the
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require the establishment of an elaborate judicial mechanism for
case screening and assignment.118
This proposal is especially suitable for OSHA cases. OSHA
regulations are national in scope; the D.C. Circuit is thus not likely
to be an inconvenient forum. Because review is limited to the
agency record and neither employers nor employees will appear in
court, "[t]he only significant convenience factor which affects peti-
tioners seeking review of rulemaking on an agency record is the
convenience of counsel who will brief and argue the petitions.
' 1 9
Moreover, as a practical matter, the counsel retained by petitioners
in OSHA standards challenges typically practice in Washington,
D.C.120
2. Exclusivity
In addition to pre-enforcement judicial review under section
6(f), persons adversely affected or aggrieved by OSHA standards
may challenge the validity of the regulations in two other ways.
Adjudicatory proceedings may be brought before the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commission) under
section 10(c).12 ' Additionally, judicial review of the Commission's
actions may be obtained pursuant to section 11(a). 122
The Commission has held,2  with judicial approval,'2 4 that it
has authority to rule on the validity of OSHA standards. A chal-
lenge to the validity of a standard may involve either substantive
claims, such as vagueness, 1 25 or procedural claims that allege im-
proper promulgation. 2 When the Act was adopted, it was gener-
D.C. Circuit the exclusive forum would preclude other circuits from deciding cases involving
purely local questions.
118. But see Note, supra note 101; discussion of Administrative Conference proposal,
supra note 115.
119. United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 697 (3d Cir. 1979).
120. For example, in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), in which the industry counsel urged retransfer from the D.C. Circuit to the Fifth
Circuit (New Orleans), three of the four counsel representing the industry petitioners were
from Washington, D.C., and one was from Oklahoma City. Id. at 966.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
123. Kennecott Copper Corp., 4 OSHC 1400, [1976-1977 OSHD (CCH) § 20,860
(1976), a/i'd 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977); Consolidated Freightways Corp., 5 OSHC 1481,
[1977-1978] OSHD (CCH) 21,846 (1977), petition for review dismissed, No. 77-2515 (9th
Cir. 1979).
124. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541, 551 (3d Cir. 1976).
125. See, e.g., Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1975); Bren-
nan v. OSHRC (Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.), 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
126. See, e.g., Noblecraft Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir.
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ally assumed that no distinction would be made between the two
types of claims by the Commission or the courts of appeal.
In National Industrial Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC,127 how-
ever, the Eighth Circuit held that while substantive attacks may be
raised in actions under sections 6(f), 10(c), or 11(a), procedural at-
tacks must be raised in a section 6(f) proceeding. Otherwise, they
will be deemed waived. As the court stated,
While the unreasonableness of a regulation may only become apparent after a
period during which an employer has made a good faith effort to comply,
procedural irregularities need not await the test of time and can be raised
immediately. The agency's interest in finality, coupled with the burden of
continuous procedural challenges raised whenever an agency attempts to en-
force a regulation, dictates against providing a perpetual forum in which the
Secretary's procedural irregularities may be raised.1
The Ninth Circuit took exactly the opposite view, though, in Mar-
shall v. Union Oil Co.12" The court in that case declared that it
would be improper to "foreclose a challenge to the procedural va-
lidity of an OSHA regulation in the absence of express authoriza-
tion from Congress. '130
The problem with the existing situation is demonstrated by
the fact that both National Industrial Constructors and Union Oil
Co. involved procedural challenges to standards adopted under
section 6(a). In this context, the Ninth Circuit correctly observed
that "to require the regulated employers to comb through industry
standards and object to their promulgation at the outset would
have been burdensome; especially when it is realized that a multi-
tude of regulations could have been promulgated without notice or
hearing within two years of the enactment of OSHA." ' On the
other hand, the Eighth Circuit appropriately adhered to the policy
that, in the interest of expediency, section 6(f) judicial review
should be the exclusive forum for procedural challenges to newly-
promulgated OSHA standards. Obviously, some resolution is
needed to this conflict.
The valid considerations of efficiency and fairness could both
be accommodated by a rule that would apply an exclusive chal-
1980); Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977).
127. 583 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1978).
128. Id. at 1052.
129. 616 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1980).
130. Id. at 1118. Accord, Deering Milliken, Inc. v. OSHRC, 630 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1980).
131. 616 F.2d at 1118.
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lenge provision only to rulemaking pursuant to section 6(b).13 2 In
those circumstances, failure to file for review under section 6(f)
would preclude review of procedural matters before the Commis-
sion or courts unless good cause is shown. Good cause might be
demonstrated, for example, by a showing that at the time of pro-
mulgation the person challenging the standard was not in business
or was not affected by the standard until after the sixty day chal-




Individual workplace inspections are an important part of the
Act's statutory compliance scheme. Because of the unprecedented
scope of the Act's coverage, a large number of well-trained safety
and health professionals is needed.13 8 Regrettably, when the Act
went into effect there was a woeful shortage of inspectors,lu and
little was done initially to correct the problem. In June, 1973, more
than two years after the Act took effect, OSHA had a staff of only
456 compliance safety officers and 68 industrial hygienists1 35 to
serve five million workplaces13 and 65 million employees.137
The inspectors were not only few in number, but they were
also poorly trained. Most inspectors lacked a formal safety and
health education and were given only a four-week training course
of dubious quality before being "turned loose" on American busi-
ness.lsa Rather than viewing their mission as one of assisting in the
elimination of workplace hazards, some inspectors were concerned
132. Such a rule would be valuable if the § 6(a) standards were repromulgated in toto.
See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
133. See generally N. ASHFORD, Cmsis IN THE WORKPLACE 424-57 (1976).
134. In 1970 there were twice as many fish and game wardens in the United States as
safety and health inspectors. S. REP. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970).
135. THE PRESmENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, 1973, at 33
(1973).
136. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE
UNrrED STATES BY INDusTRY, 1973, at vii (1975).
137. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE
UNITD STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1974, at 1 (1976). By contrast, the Bureau of Mines had 700
inspectors for 23,000 mine sites. C. Culhane, Labor, Business Press Administration to
Change Safety and Health Program, Natl J., June 1, 1972, at 1094, cited in N. ASHFORD,
supra note 133, at 427.
138. N. AsHFORD, supra note 133, at 448.
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only with citing employers for as many violations as possible.13 9
Because the inspector was often the first and only direct link be-
tween OSHA and the business community, much ill will and mis-
understanding was generated from the start.14
Since 1976 OSHA has made progress in increasing the quanti-
ty and quality of inspectors. As of May, 1980, OSHA had 996
safety officers and 579 industrial hygienists. OSHA inspectors
are now required to have professional safety and health creden-
tials, 42 and the training programs have been improved.1 " Under
OSHA's revised procedures, inspections now are also more thor-
ough. 14 Moreover, inspectors are no longer under a quota system,
and they are not rated or evaluated on the number of violations
cited.145
Despite these commendable and essential improvements,
many more inspectors are needed for effective implementation of
the Act. According to Eula Bingham, Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health, if safety inspections of high
hazard industries were conducted once each year and if inspections
of low hazard industries were conducted once every ten years,
7,800 state and federal safety inspectors would be required. If
health inspections in high hazard industries were conducted once
each year and low hazard industries were not inspected, 5,900 in-
dustrial hygienists would be required.1 48 Thus, even under a highly
concentrated system, there are presently fewer than one-third the
number of inspectors needed.1 47
139. See Tysse, "Big Mother" and the Businessman, TIUAL, Oct. 1975, at 14, 22.
140. Id. See also Occupational Safety and Health Act Review: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
54 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Dominick) (OSHA inspectors alleged to engage in punitive and
harassing tactics).
141. Whiting, supra note 19, at 262.
142. Industrial hygienists must have at least a bachelor's degree in a physical or natu-
ral science or in engineering. Safety engineers must have either a bachelor's degree in engi-
neering or must be licensed professional.engineers. Safety specialists must have at least
three years of safety experience. Conversation with OSHA Office of Personnel (Jan. 1980).
143. Whiting, supra note 19, at 261-62.
144. From 1976 to 1980, the average time for safety inspections increased from 11.2 to
16.5 hours and the average time for health inspections increased from 27.2 to 39.4 hours. Id.
at 262.
145. Id.
146. [1979 Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAETY & H-EuTH GumS (CCH) 11 11,662.
147. There are currently 2393 state inspectors, [1980] 9 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
(BNA) 1108, and 1575 federal inspectors, Whiting, supra note 19, at 261-62. This total of




Congress intended that OSHA be a cooperative effort between
employers, employees, and government. Little effort was made ini-
tially, however, to develop safety and health awareness "from the
bottom up" through employee training and education programs. In
1973 OSHA conceded that its program for private sector training
was "inadequate for achieving substantial gains in voluntary com-
pliance. '148 In 1974 OSHA initiated a series of correspondence
courses and one day seminars, but there was little progress in de-
signing or implementing large scale training programs. In 1978,
however, OSHA began awarding grants to labor organizations, em-
ployer associations, educational institutions, and nonprofit organi-
zations for the development of safety training centers.14 9 According
to OSHA officials, this grant program has been very successful. In
its first year of operation over 20,000 employers and employees re-
ceived occupational safety and health instruction. 150 Nevertheless,
it is too soon to assess whether the grant program is adequate or
whether OSHA and NIOSH will need to take a more direct role in
the training process. 51
3. On-Site Consultation
OSHA's consultative services program combines state and pri-
vate consultation as a substitute for federal on-site consultation.15 2
The program was originally given a low priority in funds and ef-
fort, and suffered from inadequate planning, direction, and evalua-
tion. 15 There were significant variations among the states in cover-
148. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, 1973, at 13
(1975).
149. The first awards, totaling $6.4 million in grants to 86 groups, were announced on
October 8, 1978. For fiscal year 1980, $11 million has been awarded for training grants.
150. [1980] EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) No. 463, at 4.
151. Section 21 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 670 (1976), provides general authority for
OSHA and NIOSH to conduct employee training and to require employer-administered
training for employees. Cf. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, § 115, 30 U.S.C. §
825 (Supp. H 1978) (detailing required employer safety and health programs and setting
minimum training standards for new miners).
152. OSHA believes that the Act precludes federal on-site consultation because § 9(a),
29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1976), requires the Secretary to issue citations for any "believed" viola-
tions found and because § 17(f), 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1976), prohibits giving advance notice of
inspections. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, LABOR NEEDS TO MAN-
AGE ITS WORKPLACE CONSULTATION PROGRAM BrTR 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CONSUL-
TATION PROGRAM].
153. CONSULTATION PROGRAM, supra note 152, at 29.
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age, services, and procedures.'" States that relied upon federal
enforcement of the Act often failed to provide state funds for on-
site consultation. As late as June, 1977, only twelve of thirty-one
jurisdictions without state plans offered on-site consultation.
In 1977 OSHA increased the amount of federal funding for
consultation programs from fifty percent to ninety percent for all
jurisdictions. By January 1, 1979, every jurisdiction had some form
of on-site consultation program: seven jurisdictions with approved
state plans provided on-site consultation directly; sixteen jurisdic-
tions with approved plans provided on-site consultation under sec-
tion 23(g)15 5 grants; twenty-three nonplan jurisdictions provided
on-site consultation under section 7(c)(1) 56 agreements; and the
remaining ten jurisdictions provided on-site consultation by direct
contracts between OSHA and private firms.157 The diversity of
these programs makes it imperative that OSHA provide improved
training, coordination, and monitoring of consultants.
By regulation, OSHA gives consultation priority to small em-
ployers.158 Nevertheless, studies have shown that a high percentage
of consultations have involved employers with more than fifty em-
ployees " 9 and that few small employers have requested consulta-
tion.1 0 Employers who used the consultation service, however, gen-
erally have been pleased, 6 ' and the program seems to have
improved. In 1979 one of every six OSHA-related visits to a work-
place was a consultative visit.1 62 Congress also places a high value
154. Id.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 672(g) (1976). This section authorizes the Secretary of Labor "to
make grants to the States to assist them in administering and enforcing programs for occu-
pational safety and health contained in State plans approved by the Secretary pursuant to
section 667 of this title." Id.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 656(c)(1) (1976). This section authorizes the Secretary of Labor to,
"with the consent of any state or political subdivision thereof, accept and use the services,
facilities, and personnel of any agency of such state or subdivision with reimbursement...
[i]n carrying out his responsibilities under this chapter." Id.
157. CONSULTATION PROGRAM, supra note 152, at 55.
158. 29 C.F.R. § 1908.4(c) (1980).
159. CONSULTATION PROGRAM, supra note 152, at 7. Of six states studied, the percent-
age of consultation visits to small employers ranged from 16% (Michigan-safety inspec-
tions) to 88% (West Virginia).
160. W. DUNKELBERG, OSHA AcTrnTy IN THE SMALL BUSINESS COMMUNrrY 10 (1976).
Less than 3% of the 420,000 members of the National Federation of Independent Busi-
nesses requested on-site consultation.
161. CONSULTATION PROGRAM, supra note 152, at 6.
162. In 1979 there were 28,000 consultative visits under OSHA grants and 17,000 on-
site consultations by the states. On May 21, 1980, OSHA announced its plan to encourage
the 15 states offering on-site consultation under state plans pursuant to § 18(b) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1976), to convert to § 7(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 656(c)(1) (1976), agreements.
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on on-site consultation. A funding limitation begun in the fiscal
1979 Department of Labor-Department of HEW Appropriations
Act1 63 prohibits OSHA from assessing penalties for nonserious vio-
lations against employers with ten or fewer employees that request
on-site consultation and make good faith efforts to eliminate the
cited hazard.
4. Enforcement Priorities
The planning and implementation of OSHA's compliance in-
spections has changed in the course of ten years from OSHA's
most lamentable failure to the area of its greatest improvement to
now the subject of its greatest controversy.
Data compiled on OSHA inspections from 1974 through 1980
demonstrates conclusively that the much-voiced criticism that
early enforcement of the Act concentrated on trivial matters rather
than upon health hazards and serious safety hazards was well-
founded. 1"
The statistics illustrate that in fiscal year 1974, 97% of all in-
spections were for safety hazards; in fiscal year 1973, 98.7% of all
alleged violations were cited as nonserious; and as late as fiscal
year 1976, the average proposed penalty was $32.73. While many
Federal funding would increase from 50% to 90% and states would be expected to comply
with the requirements set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1908 (1980). See [1980] EMPsL. SAFETY &
HEnTH GumE (CCH) 12,020. State plans officials have reacted negatively to the proposal
and view it as further unwarranted federal encroachment on the states. See [1980] 10 Oc-
cup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 241-42.
163. Departments of Labor and HEW Appropriations Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480,
92 Stat. 1567.
164. The following figures are based on OSHA Compliance Activity Reports, FY 1973-
1980.
Table 1
Safety Inspections and Health Inspections,
FY 1974 to FY 1980
FY Total Insp. Safety % Health %
1974 77,093 74,753 97.0 2340 3.0
1975 80,949 73,331 90.6 7618 9.4
1976 90,369 84,854 93.9 5515 6.1
1977 59,932 51,091 85.2 8841 14.8
1978 57,242 46,625 81.5 10,617 18.5
1979 57,937 46,796 80.8 11,141 19.2
1980 63,363 51,492 81.3 11,871 18.7
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serious hazards went undetected, 156 OSHA often issued citations











*For 1973 and 1975,
Table 2
Violations Alleged, by Degree,
FY 1973 to FY 1980
Repeated
and
Nonserious % Serious % Willful %
150,947 98.7 --- 2049* 1.3
287,896 98.5 3226 1.1 1063 0.4
312,805 98.1 --- 5987* 1.9
367,778 96.7 7820 2.0 4758 1.3
156,425 86.0 20,914 11.5 4603 2.5
96,356 71.6 33,155 24.7 4973 3.7
85,871 66.8 37,718 29.3 4955 3.9
82,945 62.6 44,695 33.8 4779 3.6
serious, willful and repeated violations were reported as a single figure.
Table 3
Penalties Proposed by OSHA per Violation,






































165. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT To THE CONGRESS, WORKPLAcs INSPECTION
PROGRAMS WEAK IN DETECTING AND CORRECTING SERIOUS HAZARDS (1980) [hereinafter cited
as WOmRPLACE INSPECTION PROGRAM].
166. For example, in one celebrated incident, OSHA reportedly cited a small marina
because an employee was out in a boat scraping barnacles without wearing a lifejacket, even
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mine if hazards were abated were either not conducted or were
conducted months after the initial inspection.6 7 Although a high
percentage of all inspections were based on apparently legitimate
employee complaints,168 the inspections usually failed to reveal
workplace hazards.169
Beginning in 1977, OSHA made major changes in its enforce-
ment priorities. The following changes occurred in the nature of
OSHA enforcement: (1) a decrease in the overall number of inspec-
tions; (2) a decrease in the number of safety inspections; (3) an
increase in the number of health inspections; (4) a decrease in the
overall number of violations cited; (5) a decrease in the number of
nonserious violations cited; (6) an increase in the number of seri-
ous, willful, and repeated violations cited; and (7) an increase in
the amount of average proposed penalties.1 70 Other remedial mea-
sures taken by OSHA include a revised complaint procedure that
makes complaint inspections more selective"7 and a "common
sense" enforcement policy that provides for the issuance of a de
minimis notice when noncompliance with a standard does not di-
rectly or immediately affect occupational safety and health. 1 7
OSHA inspections may be divided into two broad classes: un-
programmed (imminent danger, catastrophe, and fatality investi-
gations and employee complaints) and programmed. On November
1, 1980, OSHA issued a new system for conducting programmed
inspections.1 7 3 The new system attempts to simplify OSHA's 1978
scheduling system. As with the previous system, ninety-five per-
cent of programmed inspections will be conducted in "high haz-
ard" industries.17'
though the water was only three feet deep. Occupational Safety and Health Act Review:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Dominick).
167. WORKPLACE INSPECTION PROGRAM, supra note 165.
168. In fiscal year 1980, 25.4% of all inspections were based on employee complaints.
OSHA COMPIANCE Acrvrry REPORT FOR FY 1980 (1980).
169. According to a study by the General Accounting Office, 80% of all complaint
inspections failed to reveal serious or nonserious hazards. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS, How EFFECTVE ARE OSHA's COMPLAINT PROCEDURES? (1979).
170. See Tables 1-3, supra note 164.
171. OSHA Instruction CPL 2.12A (1979). See M. ROTHSTmIN, supra note 29, at § 209
(Supp. 1980). According to OSHA, the new complaint procedures decreased by 24% the
number of complaint inspections, freeing OSHA to conduct more inspections in high hazard
industries. [1980] 9 Occup. SAmY & HaLTH REP. (BNA) 995.
172. OSHA Program Directive No. 200-68 (1977). See Occupational Safety and Health
Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1976); M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 29, at §§ 89, 301.
173. OSHA Instruction CPL 2.25A (1980).
174. OSHA attempts to establish a "presence" in each dangerous industry to en-
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The initial selection of a particular category of employment
(e.g., high hazard general industry, construction, target health) is
based on an Annual Field Operators Program Plan projection
made at the area office level. Establishments within a category are
randomly selected from an establishment list for that category and
placed in an inspection cycle. Whether an establishment is consid-
ered "high hazard" is based on the enterprise's Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC).7 5
OSHA is also experimenting with compliance scheduling
based on the safety record of a particular establishment rather
,than industry-wide statistics.176 Even before the Act was passed,
some members of Congress called OSHA's enforcement scheme
an "authoritarian, penalty-oriented, 'bull-in-the-china-shop' ap-
proach. 17 7 After ten years, the views of some members of Congress
have not changed. Calling OSHA "the most despised Federal
Agency in existence,"178 Senator Schweiker proposed the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Improvements Act of 1980,179 which
would sharply revise OSHA's enforcement policy. Under the con-
troversial Schweiker bill, employers with a low injury rate and no
work-related employee deaths during a fiscal year would be "re-
warded" by having OSHA precluded from conducting routine
safety inspections the following year. The exemptions would be
based on data obtained from state workers' compensation agencies.
When this information is unavailable, however, employee affidavits
would suffice.180
Critics of the Schweiker approach question the wisdom of ex-
empting approximately ninety percent of all employers from cover-
age under the Act.181 Organized labor and other groups also oppose
courage employer safety and health actions by the threat of an inspection.
175. These figures are based on information gathered by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
176. [1980] 10 Occup. S rv & HzALTH REP. (BNA) 559.
177. Additional Minority Views on H. Rzp. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970), com-
piled in LIsLATm HISTORY OF Tma OCCUPATONAL SAFTY AND HPALTH ACT Or 1970, at 890
(Comm. Print 1971).
178. 125 CONG. Rzc. S-19249 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Schweiker).
179. S. 2153, 96th Cong., lst Seas., 125 CONG. Rzc. S-19250 (1979).
180. Other features of the bill include reduced penalties for employers with advisory
safety committees or those using any form of consultation service (including those provided
by workers' compensation insurance carriers). In addition, penalties would not be assessed
for serious or nonserious violations by either exempt employers (those that were inspected
after a fatality or employee complaint) or employers with ten or fewer employees.
181. See Lehner, Georgia Fruitcake, and OSHA's Sticks, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1980, at
24, col. 4 (eastern ed.). According to Senator Schweiker, the main purpose and effect of his
proposal would be to make OSHA more effective by better targeting inspection resources on
19811
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the provision that would permit OSHA inspections only after the
occurrence of a serious accident or fatality. Opponents fear that
exempt employers would be tempted to become lax. Furthermore,
critics argue that state workers' compensation data would not be
uniform, consistent, or accurate. They note that, due to the nature
of accident recording, workplace changes that create safety and
health hazards might not be reflected in workers' compensation
statistics for a year or more-and only after deaths or injuries. Fi-
nally, OSHA supporters contend that OSHA's new scheduling sys-
tem already targets its inspections on high hazard industries.
While the notion of encouraging voluntary compliance and re-
warding safe employers is laudable, the Schweiker bill is simply
unworkable. It is precisely because employers did not voluntarily
provide safe workplaces that OSHA was originally created. More-
over, the Schweiker plan is based on the faulty premise that an
annual or periodic OSHA inspection is a hardship by itself.182 Such
a conclusion ignores the reality of OSHA's present efforts. Those
individuals for whom an OSHA inspection could conceivably be a
burden-small employers and employers in low hazard indus-
tries--are not likely to be inspected. The possibility of an inspec-
tion may, however, encourage compliance. On the other hand,
those individuals on whom OSHA inspections focus-employers in
high hazard industries-either have unsafe workplaces183 that
should definitely be inspected or have safe workplaces and merely
suffer the slight inconvenience of a periodic OSHA inspection,'"
with no citations, penalties, or abatement requirements.
employers with poor safety records.
182. Less than two percent of employers with ten or fewer employees were inspected
by federal or state OSHA inspectors. Those inspected were (1) in high hazard industries like
construction, manufacturing, and grain elevators; or (2) in response to employee complaints,
serious accidents, or to follow-up on abatement actions. See Whiting, supra note 19, at 267.
183. Presumably, these employers would have high accident rates and would be in-
spected under either approach. In addition, OSHA has begun four pilot projects that at-
tempt to base inspections on individual employer compliance history rather than industry-
wide averages. See [1980] 10 Occup. SAmETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 559.
184. According to one estimate, the average cost to an employer with 100 to 200 em-
ployees of an OSHA inspection would be about $1000, including $600 to $700 for compliance
costs. J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY: AN EcONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 137 (1979). Cf. Oi, On the Economics of Industrial Safety, 38
LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 669, 698 & n.80 (1974) (estimating cost of an OSHA inspection at
$200 for an employer and $250-300 for OSHA). Even the $1000 figure represents only a
small percentage of what some employers spend in attempting to prevent an OSHA inspec-
tion. See Lehner, OSHA Resisters May Suffer From Bad Advice, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1979,
at 16, col. 3 (eastern ed.).
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5. OSHA's Effectiveness and Expense
At the heart of the "OSHA reform" efforts is the belief that
OSHA has been ineffective in reducing workplace injuries and ill-
nesses and that the annual costs of compliance with OSHA are ex-
cessive.10 5 As support for his proposed Occupational Safety and
Health Improvements Act of 1980,186 Senator Schweiker noted that
from 1972 to 1978, while the overall injury and illness rate declined
from 10.5 to 9.4 per 100 employees, injuries and illnesses resulting
in lost workdays increased from 3.2 to 4.1 per 100 employees.' 87
Senator Schweiker concluded from these figures that "the success
of the act in delivering on its promise has been substantially less
than overwhelming."' 188 OSHA supporters countered, however, with
statistics compiled by the National Safety Council that demon-
strate a decrease in the workplace death rate per 100,000 workers
from 17 in 1973 to 13 in 1979.' 89 The OSHA supporters also
pointed out that there has been a substantial decline in injuries
and illnesses in the hazardous industries to which OSHA devotes
most of its inspection efforts."°0
Despite the frequency with which they are cited, injury and
illness statistics, such as those just noted, are not conclusive in-
dicators of OSHA's impact. This is true for several reasons. First,
in order to determine whether OSHA has been effective, it is nec-
essary to predict what injury and illness rates would have been in
the absence of OSHA and to compare those figures with the actual
rates. 9' Obviously, no such data exists. Second, it has been esti-
mated that only about twenty-five percent of workplace injuries
are preventable by enforcement of current OSHA standards."2
The remaining injuries are either unpreventable (e.g., traffic acci-
dents, heart attacks, or violent acts) or are presently not covered
185. According to McGraw-Hill Publications Co., capital expenditures for compliance
with OSHA were $3.7 billion in 1980 and will be $3.5 billion in 1981. [1980] 10 Occup.
SAFETY & HzmTH Rzp. (BNA) 16.
186. S. 2153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. S-19250 (1979).
187. 125 CONG. Rsc. S-19248 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Schweiker).
188. Id.
189. See [1980] EmPL. SAFETY & HEALTH Gums (CCH) No. 468, at 3.
190. From 1973 to 1978, injuries and illnesses at construction sites and in the machin-
ery industry declined by 19%, and injuries and illnesses in the primary metals industry
declined by 18%. Whiting, supra note 19, at 268.
191. J. MENDELoF?, supra note 184, at 94. See also Ginnold, A View of the Costs and
Benefits of the Job Safety and Health Law, MoNTLy LAB. Rxv., Aug. 1980, at 24.
192. FINAL REPORT OF Tim INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON WOmPLACE SAFETY AND
HATH, 11-7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
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by OSHA regulations. A study conducted in California that was
limited to an examination of OSHA-regulated hazards revealed
that the enforcement of OSHA standards led to a twenty percent
reduction in injuries."9 Third, increases in lost workday cases may
be traced to increases in strains, sprains, and overextensions.2"
The California study noted that, while the number of falls from
elevations decreased, the total number of slips and falls remained
the same.195 It has been theorized that more employees now
"stretch" sprains into lost workday accidents in order to take ad-
vantage of increased workers' compensation benefits.' 96 Finally, the
benefits of OSHA enforcement may not be presently quantifiable.
For example, it has been estimated that the asbestos standard
saves 1596 lives per year. 97 Yet, because asbestos-related diseases
may have latency periods of twenty to thirty years, the impact of
present enforcement efforts may not be realized statistically for
many years.
A similar data-related controversy surrounds the compliance
costs that the Act imposes on American business and industry.
Business groups charge that the costs are not justified and that as
much as one-third of the expenditures required for compliance
may be wasted.'98 Conversely, pro-OSHA groups and individuals
assert that the benefits of OSHA outweigh the costs. According to
one study,"9 OSHA's safety program prevents 350 deaths and
40,000 to 60,000 injuries each year, resulting in an annual benefit
of $5.1 billion. In addition, statistics indicate that the Act results
in new jobs, a decrease in lost worktime, increased productivity,
and other benefits.00
193. See J. MlwELoFF, supra note 184, at 113. In California, since 1973 amputations
have declined by over 40%, explosion injuries have declined by over 28%, and crushing
injuries have declined by over 17%. Whiting, supra note 19, at 269. See also Work Injuries
and Illnesses in California Quarterly (1980) (43% decline in fatality rate in the period of
1969-1978).
194. See Whiting, supra note 19, at 269 (13% increase in sprains and strains in Cali-
fornia between 1973 and 1978).
195. J. MENDELOFF, supra note 184, at 113-16.
196. Id.
197. SENATE COMM. ON GovERNMENTAL AFFAms, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S.
Doc. No. 96-13, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (Comm. Print 1978).
198. See DE BaNARDO, OSHA. OvRPmc AND UNDER THE GUN (1979) (U.S. Chamber
of Commerce publication citing a study by Williams and Engel).
199. R. NaR, M. GREEN & N. WArrzmAN, BusNmss WAR ON THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE BENFrrrs OF FEDaRAL HmTH/SAraY ENFORCEMENT (1979).
200. See Whiting, Regulatory Reform and OSHA: Fads and Realities, 30 LAB. L.J. 514
(1979). See also SuBcoMM. ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss. ENVIRONMENTAL AND
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As with the statistics of OSHA's effectiveness, estimates of
compliance costs and benefits are neither precise nor wholly relia-
ble. Cost-effectiveness is a difficult criterion with which to evaluate
the impact of federal regulation. As one Senate panel stated,
"[G]eneral assertions on whether the burden is too great, or
whether the expense far exceeds the benefits, should-on the basis
of existing knowledge-be guarded and qualified."20 1
6. Congressional Appropriations Limitations
Despite increasing political pressure, the substantive provi-
sions of the Act have not been amended since its passage in 1970.
There have been, however, a number of provisions attached to La-
bor Department appropriations that have placed limits on OSHA
enforcement.
Beginning in 1976, Congress attempted to channel OSHA's en-
forcement activities into the most critical areas and to relieve the
burden on employers in industries with little or no serious occupa-
tional safety and health hazards. Consistent with this approach the
Labor Department-HEW Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1977202
contained two limitations. First, OSHA could not assess penalties
for first-instance nonserious violations unless ten or more viola-
tions were cited. Second, farmers with ten or fewer employees, ex-
cept those with migrant labor camps, were exempted from the Act.
These limitations were continued in fiscal year 1978203 and
were supplemented by two additional provisions in the fiscal year
1979 appropriations.20' First, OSHA could not promulgate or en-
force any regulation restricting work activity in any recreational
hunting, fishing, or shooting area. Second, OSHA could not assess
penalties for nonserious violations against small employers that re-
quested on-site consultation and made good faith efforts to abate
violations.
The continuing appropriations resolution for fiscal year
1980205 contained the four previous limitations and added three
HMTH/SAFETY REGULATIONS, PRODuCTIvTY, GROWTH, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: AN As-
sBssMrNT 58-65 (Comm: Print 1980) (safety and health regulations reduced productivity
growth rate by only 0.05% between 1970 and 1975).
201. See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 197.
202. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418.
203. J. Res. of Dec. 9, 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460.
204. Act of Oct. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-480, 92 Stat. 1567.
205. J. Res. of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, 93 Stat. 923.
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important new ones.2 6 The most important provision prohibits
OSHA from inspecting employers with ten or fewer employees in
industries with three-digit standard industrial classification injury
and illness rates of less than seven per one hundred employees.
There are several exceptions to the limitations, specifically, inspec-
tions are permitted (1) in response to complaints, (2) for failures to
correct, (3) for willful violations, (4) to investigate accidents, (5)
for imminent dangers, (6) for health hazards, and (7) to investigate
discrimination complaints. Under the 1980 Appropriations Bill,
OSHA is also prohibited in states with approved plans from in-
specting workplaces for six months after a state inspection. Excep-
tions are provided for investigations of employee complaints or fa-
talities, special studies, and accompanied monitoring visits.
Additionally, a final new limitation prohibits any enforcement ac-
tivity on the Outer Continental Shelf in excess of the authority
granted to OSHA in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 207 and
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978.208
Even if major amendments are not made to the Act, it is likely
that enforcement limitations will continue to be added to appro-
priations bills.2 0 ' Nevertheless, a policy of increasingly broader ex-
emptions may be questioned. It has been estimated that 120 fatili-
ties and 190,000 injuries will occur annually in industries exempt
from OSHA coverage under the 1980 Appropriations Resolution.210
There is little justification for jeopardizing the health and safety of
employees by relieving employers of the alleged burdens of OSHA
compliance.
206. The 1981 appropriations resolution contains the same limitations as the 1980 res-
olution. J. Res. of Dec. 16, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-536 (providing funding through June 5,
1981).
207. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976).
208. Act of Sept. 18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629.
209. On July 30, 1980, the Senate voted 85 to 14 to amend the Act to prohibit routine
safety inspections of employers with ten or fewer employees and better than average safety
records. See Shabecoff, Administration Assails Senate "Antiworker" Vote, N.Y. Times,
July 31, 1980, § D, at 1, col. 2. See generally Seminario, OSHA's Future: Fighting Perennial
Battles, AFL-CIO AM. FED wTOmNIsT, July, 1980, at 20.
210. Whiting, supra note 19, at 264. If the Schweiker Bill were passed or added as an
appropriations limitation, the results would be even more unfortunate. On April 27, 1978, a
scaffold collapsed on an electric utility cooling tower at Willow Island, West Virginia, killing
51 employees. The prime contractor would have been exempt under the Schweiker bill for
having a safe workplace. See Hearings on S. 2153 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1980) (Testimony of Joseph W. Powell); Hear-
ings on S. 2153, Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21
(1980) (Testimony of Ray Denison).
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B. The Carrot and the Stick
A lack of acceptance by employers has been one of OSHA's
most persistent problems.2 11 Enforcement of the Act depends on
voluntary, preinspection compliance. The present enforcement
scheme has been ineffective because there are no incentives for
compliance and insufficient deterrents for noncompliance. New ini-
tiatives are needed in both areas.
1. Incentives
Although the Schweiker bill justifiably sought to encourage
safe and healthful workplaces through a reward system, the plan
for implementation was flawed in two respects. First, the rewards
to employers would come at the expense of employees. Second, the
rewards would operate prospectively; that is, a good past safety
record would lead to a possibly unjustified limited exemption in
the future.
Any workable incentive system must avoid the shortcomings
of the Schweiker approach. One of the easiest and most effective
incentives involves the use of taxes.2 12 As a means of encouraging
and rewarding actual compliance, tax incentives, beyond those now
in existence, could be provided for the purchase of new safety and
health equipment.2 13 The tax incentive would be for a limited du-
ration and would be contingent upon compliance with a particular
standard. For example, in order to qualify for a tax credit or de-
duction for the purchase of equipment to comply with a certain
new standard, the equipment would have to be purchased and in-
stalled during the standard's phase-in period. Tax incentives could
also be made available to employers that have low employee injury
211. See TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at H-6, VIII-1.
212. Tax incentives already exist for a variety of "encouraged" expenditures, but the
only one that assists employers in compliance with OSHA is the investment tax credit,
I.R.C. § 38. Other examples of tax incentives are I.R.C. § 40 (jobs credit); I.R.C. § 44(c)
(residential energy credit); I.R.C. § 167(k) (accelerated depreciation of expenditures to reha-
bilitate low income housing); I.R.C. § 169 (accelerated amortization of pollution control
equipment). Section 552 of the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 552, 92 Stat.
2763, required the Secretary of the Treasury to study possible tax incentives for OSHA
compliance. See generally McDaniel & Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax Sys-
tem to Combat Air and Water Pollution: A Case Study in Tax Expenditures, 12 B.C. IND.
& Comm. L. REV. 351 (1970); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern-
ment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705
(1970).
213. Industry is investing $3 billion a year in capital equipment for workplace safety
and health, but this sum has remained virtually unchanged, after adjustments for inflation,
since 1970. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at IV-22.
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rates. This proposal, although similar in theory to the Schweiker
bill, would not expose employees to new risks and would be easier
to administer.214 Fraud could be deterred through normal Internal
Revenue Service audits. Furthermore, section 17(g)2 15 of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act makes it a crime punishable by
imprisonment for not more than six months, a fine of up to
$10,000, or both, to knowingly file any false document required to
be maintained under the Act.
A variety of other incentives should also be explored. One pro-
posal would amend federal tax law to prevent employers with high
injury and illness rates from deducting that part of their workers'
compensation cost that exceeds the average cost for employers of
similar size in their industry. This proposal would also allow em-
ployers with low injury and illness rates to deduct the full average
cost of workers' compensation even if their own cost is much
lower.2 16 A second proposal would involve direct government eco-
nomic assistance to employers. 17
2. Deterrents
OSHA's present deterrent against noncompliance is the assess-
ment of civil penalties. OSHA's proposed penalties have been so
small, however, that they are hardly a deterrent to most employ-
ers.2 18 Moreover, ninety percent of the cases in which a notice of
contest is filed by the employer are settled. 9 If the case is not
settled, there is a seventy percent chance that the proposed pen-
214. Under the system, no reliance upon affidavits or workers' compensation data
would be necessary. Instead, employer-maintained records of accidents and illnesses, which
already are required by OSHA, would be used. It might be argued by employees that such a
credit would encourage employers to keep injured employees on the job to keep down the
lost workday rate. Nevertheless, workers' compensation insurance rates already are enough
incentive for some unscrupulous employers to engage in this practice.
215. 29 U.S.C. § 666(g) (1976).
216. See TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 192, at IV-11.
217. Id. at IV-17 to -20.
218. See note 164 supra. A record $786,190 proposed penalty assessed against New-
port News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. was a recent notable exception. [1980] EmiL.
SArLzv & HnATH GumE (CCH) No. 460, at 3. The company has contested the alleged viola-
tions and penalties.
219. This high settlement rate is mandated by the increased percentage of contested
cases and the small legal staff of the Secretary. Consequently, settlement agreements often
permit the employer to promise to abate the cited hazards in exchange for a reduction or
elimination of the proposed penalties. While this policy does result in prospective abate-
ment, it removes the penalty deterrent and may encourage employers to wait until they are
cited to eliminate hazards.
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alty will be reduced or vacated entirely.220
The Act imposes its most severe civil penalties for repeated 221
and willful2 2' violations and for failure to correct 2" 3 previously
cited hazards. These penalties, however, are used only infre-
quently."14 In fact, the Act's criminal sanctions for giving advance
notice of an inspection" 5 and for filing false records or making
false statements' 26 have never been used. In the few criminal ac-
tions brought under section 17(e)" 7 for willful violations resulting
in the death of one or more employees, the maximum sentence has
been a $5000 fine-one-half the maximum civil penalty.'2 8 In addi-
tion, no steps have been taken to prevent employers from filing
spurious notices of contest or bad faith petitions for modification
of abatement solely for the purpose of delay."'
The Corporate Crime Bill,'3 0 introduced in the House Judici-
ary Committee in 1980, provides for fines of up to $250,000 and
sentences of up to five years for corporate officials and fines of up
to $1,000,000 for corporations convicted of failing to report within
fifteen days a "serious concealed danger" involving health and
safety or dangerous products to the appropriate federal regulatory
agency, including OSHA. Also, any employer who discriminates
against an employee "whistleblower" would be subject to a $10,000
fine and one year imprisonment.
OSHA will not be a meaningful deterrent until the cost of
220. According to Commission figures for fiscal 1978, the citation was vacated in 19%
of the cases, the penalty was reduced to $0 in 4% of the cases, the penalty was reduced in
47% of the cases, the Secretary's proposal was affirmed in 29% of the cases, and the penalty
was increased in 1% of the cases.
221. Section 17(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976), provides for a maximum of
$10,000 for each violation.
222. Id. Although the Act does not define "willful violation," § 17(a) provides that
"any employer who willfully... violates [the Act]... may be assessed a civil penalty of
not more than $10,000 for each violation."
223. Section 17(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1976), provides for a maximum of
$1000 for each day during which a failure to correct continues.
224. See note 164 supra.
225. Section 17(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1976), provides for a fine of up to
$1000 or imprisonment for up to six months, or both.
226. Section 17(g) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(g) (1976), provides for a fine of up to
$10,000 or imprisonment for up to six months, or both.
227. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1976). Conviction carries a fine of up to $10,000 or imprison-
ment for up to six months, or both for the first offense, and subsequent offenses carry fines
of up to $20,000 or imprisonment for up to one year, or both.
228. See M. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 29, at 321 n.49.
229. For an explanation of, and proposals to eliminate, this problem, see id. at 289-93.




noncompliance becomes greater than the cost of compliance. Ac-
cording to one recommendation, high workers' compensation rates
could be an effective deterrent. If legislation were passed establish-
ing federal minimum payment levels for workers' compensation,
the greatly increased costs to employers with unsafe and un-




In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,2"2 the Supreme Court held that
nonconsensual OSHA inspections may only be made pursuant to a
warrant. Although the numerous legal issues raised by Barlow's are
beyond the scope of this Article, 33 the case has had an important
impact on OSHA enforcement. An increasing number of employers
are insisting that a warrant be presented, 3' and this has placed an
added burden on OSHA personnel.2 5 It is possible, however, that
once a more definitive rule of probable cause for OSHA warrants
evolves,"' and as courts begin to require exhaustion of employer
claims before the Commission,2 7 the percentage of employers de-
manding warrants will return to "manageable proportions."
In Barlow's the Supreme Court indicated that, with an appro-
priate regulation, the Secretary could obtain an ex parte war-
rant.2 8 When his original regulation authorizing "compulsory pro-
cess" was held not to include ex parte warrants,3 9 the Secretary
231. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at IV-12 to -14. For a discussion of the
efforts to pass federal workers' compensation legislation, see De Leon, Workers' Compensa-
tion: A Legal System in Jeopardy, 29 FEu'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 337 (1979).
232. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
233. See generally M. RoTHsmN, supra note 29, at 65-74 (Supp. 1980); Rothstein,
OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 DUKE L.J. 63; Note, Procedures for
Attacking OSHA Inspection Warrants, 66 VA. L. REv. 983 (1980).
234. According to OSHA's Office of Management Data, 2.6% of employers demanded
warrants in the period from October, 1978 to April, 1980. At least some of these demands
may simply reflect bad legal advice. See Lehner, supra note 184.
235. The Court in Barlow's predicted: "We doubt that the consumption of enforce-
ment energies in the obtaining of such warrants will exceed manageable proportions." 436
U.S. at 321. See also id. at 316 n.11.
236. See, e.g., Burkhart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313 (7th
Cir. 1980).
237. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1979).
238. 436 U.S. at 320 n.15.
239. Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 467 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d
964 (3d Cir. 1980).
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issued an "interpretive rule' 4 0 redefining "compulsory process" to
include ex parte warrants. In Cerro Metal Products Co. v. Mar-
shall,24 1 however, the Third Circuit held that the amendment was
a legislative change and not an interpretive rule; consequently,
OSHA had failed to comply with the notice and comment require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).242
Another inspection-related OSHA regulation ran afoul of the
APA in Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA.24 3 In that case the D.C.
Circuit reasoned that an amendment to an OSHA regulation 24 4
that "interpreted" section 11(c)(1)21 5 as requiring that employees
be compensated for "walkaround" time was a legislative rule
rather than an interpretive regulation. The court thus held that
the provision was not exempt from the APA's notice and comment
requirement. The D.C. Circuit noted that, in addition to the APA's
legal requirements, ample administrative and political justification
exists for public involvement in the determination of policy mat-
ters. As the court observed, "Charting changes in policy direction
with the aid of those who will be affected by the shift in course
helps dispel suspicions of agency predisposition, unfairness, arro-
gance, improper influence, and ulterior motivation. ' '24 6
2. State Plans
In AFL-CIO v. Marshall"27 the D.C. Circuit examined the Sec-
retary's criteria for the approval of state plans under section 18 of
the Act. The court held that OSHA's regulations and practices
were inadequate to ensure that approved state plans maintained
suffficient personnel and adequate funding.248 On remand, the dis-
trict court ordered OSHA to submit a comprehensive plan estab-
240. 43 Fed. Reg. 59,838 (1978) (amending 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1978)).
241. 620 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). Contra, Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d
984 (9th Cir. 1980).
242. OSHA has subsequently promulgated a new regulation in accordance with the
APA. See 45 Fed. Reg. 65,916 (1980).
243. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. OSHA, No. 78-2221 (D.C. Cir. July
10, 1980).
244. 42 Fed. Reg. 47,344 (1977) (amending 29 C.F.R. § 1977.21 (1979)).
245. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976).
246. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. OSHA, No. 78-2221 (D.C. Cir. July
10, 1980). The regulation was subsequently revoked, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,118 (1980), and pro-
posed again in accordance with the APA. 45 Fed. Reg. 75,232 (1980).
247. 570 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978).




lishing federal benchmarks for state staffing and funding.24 9
OSHA's state plan benchmarks were submitted to the court on
April 25, 1980.50 The plan, which would require an overall increase
in state inspectors from 2393 to 7462 over a five year period, 51 was
described by several state agencies as "totally without justification,
economically impractical, politically impossible, administratively
unachievable, and simply put, ridiculous. ' 25 2 In an amici curiae
brief, a number of states argued that OSHA should be required to
go through a rulemaking process before adopting its proposed
benchmarks.253
The AFL-CIO case has cast further doubt on the continued
viability of a state plan system whose effectiveness has long been
questioned. 54 In the Act's ten year existence none of the twenty-
three state plans has been given final approval, and two state plans
have been withdrawn because they were too expensive for the
states to fund.2 55 In addition OSHA has recently begun actions to
withdraw its preliminary approval of two other state plans.256 Or-
ganized labor has long opposed state plans, believing them to be
ineffective. Multi-state corporations also have become dis-
enchanted with state plans because of the added burden of com-
plying with variations in the requirements and procedures among
the state and federal programs. In light of these circumstances,
Congress should consider the repeal of section 18 in order to make
the federal scheme applicable in every state.
3. Federal Employee Protection
Section 19(a)2 57 of the Act requires the head of each federal
agency to establish and maintain a comprehensive occupational
safety and health program that is consistent with OSHA's promul-
249. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 6 OSHC 2128, [1978] OSHD (CCH) 23,177 (D.D.C.).
250. See [1980] 9 OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1107.
251. OSHA recommended a phase-in period of ten years, but the district court's order
on remand directed OSHA to prepare a five year phase-in period.
252. [1979] 9 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH RET. (BNA) 469 (statement of John C. Brooks,
North Carolina Commissioner of Labor and Chairman of the National Occupational Safety
and Health State Plan Association, after reviewing a draft version of the benchmark plan).
253. [1980] 10 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 123.
254. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, STATES' PROTECTION
OF WORKERS NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (1976).
255. The Connecticut plan was abolished in 1977 and the Colorado plan was abolished
in 1978.
256. Withdrawal of approval proceedings are pending against the Virginia and Indiana
state plans. See 45 Fed. Reg. 65,625 (1980) (Virginia plan).
257. 29 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1976).
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gated standards. This congressional directive to the departments
and agencies of the federal government has been augmented by ex-
ecutive orders258 and by regulations of the Secretary of Labor. 59
Despite the provision's seemingly strong underpinning, imple-
mentation of section 19 has been a dismal failure. From 1974 to
1976, work-related fatalities increased from 104 to 122 and total
injuries and illnesses increased from 121,052 to 174,989.260 These
increases have been attributed in great part to the weak enforce-
ment of the federal government program.61 Specifically, the Secre-
tary of Labor's authority has been limited to coordination and con-
sultation, and agencies have not been required to comply with
actual OSHA standards.
On February 26, 1980, a new executive order was issued to give
added protection to Federal Government employees.2 62 Among
other provisions, the executive order (1) requires agency heads to
comply with OSHA standards except when the Secretary of Labor
approves alternatives; (2) requires agency heads to render work-
places free of recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to
cause death or serious physical harm;263 (3) assures employees pro-
tection against discrimination for the exercise of protected rights,
such as filing reports about unsafe working conditions; (4) provides
for the establishment of occupational safety and health committees
composed of representatives of management and an equal number
of nonmanagement employees to monitor the agency's job safety
and health performance; and (5) authorizes the Secretary of Labor
to conduct unannounced inspections under certain circum-
stances 26 4 and, if violations are found, to report them to the head
of the agency and the occupational safety and health committee.
258. Exec. Order No. 11612, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,891 (1971); Exec. Order No. 11807, 39
Fed. Reg. 35,559 (1974); Exec. Order No. 12196, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,769 (1980).
259. 29 C.F.R. Part 1960 (1979); Field Operations Manual ch. XIX (1980). OSHA has
issued new regulations for federal employee safety and health programs. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,796
(1980).
260. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STATISTICS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FY
1976, at 1-2 (1978).
261. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at VI-24 to -27.
262. Exec. Order No. 12,196, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,769 (1980). The effective date, originally
scheduled for July 1, 1980, was delayed until October 15, 1980. Exec. Order No. 12,223, 45
Fed. Reg. 45,235 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 64,873 (1980).
263. This requirement corresponds to the Act's "general duty clause," 29 U.S.C. §
654(a)(1) (1976).
264. The circumstances are (a) if an agency does not have an occupational safety and
health committee; (b) if the committee has filed reports of unsafe or unhealthful conditions;




The need for such an executive order was underscored two years
ago when a district court in the District of Columbia dismissed an
action brought by federal employees for injunctive relief against
allegedly unsafe conditions.2 6 5 The executive order is particularly
important in light of the fact that congressional attempts to in-
crease the protection afforded employees of the United States Pos-
tal Service, whose injury rate is extremely high, have also been un-
successful."6' It remains to be seen whether the new executive
order-the only existing protection for federal employees-will be
successful in improving the often substandard working conditions
that federal workers encounter.
IV. ADJUDICATION
A. The Role of the Commission
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission is an
independent, quasi-judicial administrative agency created to adju-
dicate contested matters resulting from the Secretary of Labor's
issuance of citations and proposed penalties. 67 The creation of an
independent adjudicatory panel was part of an amendment to the
Senate bill offered by Senator Javits. The original legislation would
have placed the adjudicative function within the Department of
Labor.268 The Act's scheme for adjudication represents an experi-
ment in administrative procedure that differs from traditional ad-
ministrative structures in which both enforcement and adjudica-
tion functions are vested in a single agency.
In general, the concept of an independent adjudicatory body
has been received favorably. The most attractive feature is that
"[t]he creation of a separate quasi-judicial agency removes the ap-
pearance of an improper commingling of the functions of prosecu-
265. Federal Employees for Non-Smokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181
(D.D.C. 1978), af'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979) (neither
implied right of action under § 19 of OSHA nor federal common-law right of action);
Rambeau v. Dow, 553 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1977) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
266. S. 2558, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 826, 6913, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980).
In 1977 Postal Service employees suffered 90,358 accidents, accounting for 44.5% of all inju-
ries and 16.2% of all fatalities in the federal sector. [1979] 9 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH Rm'.
(BNA) 34. See also [1980] 10 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 485-86.
267. See generally M. ROTHsTEmN, supra note 29, at §§ 341-357.
268. Many business leaders feared delegating both enforcement and adjudication pow-
ers to the Secretary of Labor. Occupational Health and Safety Act: Hearings on Amend-
ment No. 1061 to S. 2193 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st
Cong., 2d Seas. (1970) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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tor and judge." '269 A second independent adjudicatory body, the
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission,27 was created in
1977 when Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act.2 71
Despite receiving such general support as an institution, the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission has been the
subject of several specific criticisms.27 2 The Commission has been
troubled by a lack of unanimity of its members,2 73 a lack of consis-
tency in decisions, 27 14 a lack of clarity in opinion writing, 7 5 and an
inability to decide cases promptly.278
B. The Commission's Case Load
1. The Backlog
Perhaps the single greatest challenge facing the Commission is
dealing with its ever-increasing case load. Although the number of
269. Currie, OSHA, 1976 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1107, 1160.
270. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (Supp. II 1978).
271. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. II 1978).
272. See generally Couric, OSHRC: Not Yet an Authoritative, Respected Voice, Legal
Times of Washington, July 7, 1980, at 8, col. 1.
273. A recent study revealed that 79.8% of the Commission decisions reaching the
courts of appeals contained a dissenting opinion. Rothstein, supra note 98, at 621. More-
over, personality clashes among Commission members have often resulted in vitriolic opin-
ions. See, e.g., Francisco Tower Serv., Inc., 4 OSHC 1459, [1976-1977] OSHD (CCH)
20,917 (1976); Francisco Tower Serv., Inc., 3 OSHC 1952, [1975-1976] OSHD (CCH)
20,401 (1976).
274. The Commission has frequently changed its position on key issues. For recent
examples of Commission reversals, see Keppel's Inc., 7 OSHC 1442, [1979] OSHD (CCH) I
23,622, petition for review dismissed, No. 79-2045 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 1980) (oral notice of con-
test); S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc., 7 OSHC 1260, [1979] OSHD (CCH) 23,480, petition
for review filed, No. 79-2358 (5th Cir. June 7, 1979) (burden of proving feasibility); Gilbert
Mfg. Co., 7 OSHC 1611, [1979] OSHD (CCH) 23,782 (contest of abatement date); Potlatch
Corp., 7 OSHC 1061, [1979] OSHD (CCH) 1 23,294 (repeated violation); IMC Chem. Group,
Inc., 6 OSHC 2075, [1978] OSHD (CCH) 123,149, rev'd, 9 OSHC 1031, [1980] OSHD (CCH)
1 24,990 (withdrawal of citation); Owens-Illinois, Inc., 6 OSHC 2162, [1978] OSHD (CCH)
23,218 (trade secrets).
275. As the dissenting opinion in Farmers Export Co. noted:
The failure to confront issues and to fully explain the rationale for a decision contrib-
utes to the subsequent issuance of inconsistent decisions by the Commission's adminis-
trative law judges and the need for Commission review of such decisions, thereby un-
necessarily adding to the Commission's case load and the general confusion and delay
that characterize the adjudication of OSHA cases.
Farmers Export Co., 8 OSHC 1655, 1665 n.8, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 24,569, at 30,088 (Cot-
tine, Comm'r, dissenting). See also Samson Paper Bag Co., 8 OSHC 1515, [1980] OSHD
(CCH) 1 24,555.
276. Even Chairman Cleary has been quoted as saying that he is "not particularly
proud of the speed with which cases are disposed of" by the Commission. [1980] 9 Occup.
SAPE'rY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 949. See notes 277-96 infra and accompanying text.
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citations issued has declined sharply since fiscal year 1976,27 the
decrease has been more than offset by a significant increase in the
number of citations that are contested.27 8 It is likely that the in-
creased notice of contest rate is the result of changes in OSHA's
enforcement policy that emphasize (1) health hazards (with their
attendant high abatement costs); (2) serious, willful, and repeated
violations; and (3) higher proposed penalties.279
The Commission's high settlement rate, which is currently
around ninety percent, has helped to reduce its workload.2 80 Nev-
ertheless, the Commission's administrative law judges (ALJs) take
a long time to decide cases that proceed to a hearing, and the
Commission takes an even longer time to decide cases that are
later directed for review. A 1978 study281 found that Commission
ALJs took an average of 169 days to decide cases and that the
Commission took an average of 437 days from the date of the di-
rection for review to issue a decision. The total of 606 days 28 was
277. See Table 2, supra note 164.
278. Table 4
Contested Cases, FY 1973 to FY 1980
Percentage of Citations









This table is based on OSHA Compliance Activity Reports for FY 1973 to FY 1980. Effec-
tive November 1, 1980, OSHA Area Directors are authorized to enter into informal settle-
ment agreements with employers before notices of contest are filed and the litigation pro-
cess begins. [1980] EMIL. SAFETY & HEALTH GumE (CCH) No. 494, at 1.
279. See Tables 1-3, supra note 164. Cases appealed to the United States courts of
appeals are even more likely to involve other than nonserious violations, high penalties, and
high abatement costs. See Rothstein, supra note 98, at 610-14.
280. According to the Commission, 92.0% of all cases in fiscal year 1980 were resolved
without a hearing. This figure includes settlements and unilateral actions, such as with-
drawal of the complaint by the Secretary or withdrawal of the notice of contest by the
employer. OSHRC Office of Information, October 26, 1980.
281. ColprRou.R GENERAL's REPORT To THE CONGRESS, ADMINISTRATIWE LAW PRO-
css: BETrER MANAGEMENT Is Naansn 11 (1978).
282. This total does not include the period from the filing of the notice of contest to
the date of the hearing. According to Commission figures for 1976, an average of 150 days
elapsed between the filing of the notice of contest and the hearing. This figure is, undoubt-
edly, even higher today due to increased emphasis upon pleadings and discovery. See note
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the longest time required by any of the agencies studied and com-
pares with 281 days for the Department of Labor and 386 days for
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
No single or simple explanation exists for the Commission's
long delays in deciding cases. The following factors may be rele-
vant, however. First, because the filing of a notice of contest stays
an employer's abatement requirement,283 employers have little in-
centive to have their cases decided promptly. In some instances,
employers actually endeavor to delay the proceedings as long as
possible. Second, understaffing and, perhaps, incompetence'" in
the Department of Labor has caused delays in the adjudicatory
process.285 Third, the lack of unanimity among Commission mem-
bers has delayed the decisional process because of the frequency of
separate opinions2 and the constant reconsideration of prece-
dent.287 Fourth, OSHA cases are increasingly complex and focus
upon time-consuming evaluation of health hazards, cost-benefit
analysis, and general duty clause violations.88
296 infra.
283. Sections 10(b) and 17(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(b), 666(d) (1976). Although
the issue is beyond the scope of this Article, the Commission should consider promulgating
disciplinary rules for lawyers and other representatives appearing before the Commission
who file pleadings, motions, and other documents in bad faith or for delay purposes or who
otherwise engage in contumacious conduct. The ultimate sanction might be prohibiting
them from appearing before the Commission.
284. Commissioner Barnako has criticized OSHA's "cavalier" attitude toward Com-
mission cases and has asserted that in 75% of the cases OSHA has filed at least one request
for an extension to fie a brief and sometimes has requested three or four extensions. [1980]
EmPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GumE (CCH) No. 411, at 3-4. See also Dravo Corp. v. OSHRC, 584
F.2d 637, 638 n.1 (3d Cir. 1978) (court critical of OSHA's repeated failure to meet briefing
deadlines); Ringland-Johnson, Inc. v. Dunlop, 551 F.2d 1117, 1118 (8th Cir. 1977) (court
critical of OSHA's "slipshod handling of litigation").
285. The quality of all government ALJs has also been questioned. See Olin Constr.
Co. v. OSHRC, 525 F.2d 464, 466 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (urging organized course of instruction
for ALJs to eliminate their "rash of ... blunders"). See generally Scalia, The ALJ Fi-
asco-A Reprise, 47 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 57 (1979). Little evidence exists, however, to suggest
that Commission ALJs are less qualified or trained than the ALJs of other agencies who
complete their decisions more promptly. Thus, even if Commission ALJs are too slow, this
would not account for the inter-agency disparity. In fiscal year 1980 the Commission's 46
ALJs issued 581 decisions. This number amounts to about one decision per month for each
ALJ. See Table 6 infra.
286. A study of Commission decisions appealed to the United States courts of appeals
found that fully 94.7% of the cases contained a concurrence, a dissent, or both. Rothstein,
supra note 98, at 621.
287. See note 274 supra.
288. According to John Mills, Acting Director of OSHA's Office of Field Coordination,
employers were cited under the general duty clause, § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976),
5,000 times in 1979, compared with "1,500 or fewer" citations in 1974. [1980] 10 Occut.
SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 68.
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The combination of an increased caseload and a slow decision-
making process has resulted in a large backlog of cases awaiting
decision. At the end of July, 1975, the Commission had a backlog
of "only" 432 cases."8 9 During 1976, however, the backlog grew tre-
mendously, due to former Commissioner Moran's "protest policy"
that effectively directed every case for review.2 90 On January 1,
1977, 1012 cases awaited decision.291 Although much of the current
backlog is still attributed to former Commissioner Moran's direc-
tions for review, 292 by August 3, 1977, the backlog had been re-
duced to 407 cases 8---roughly the 1975 level. In the last three
years the backlog has dropped somewhat but remains at between
300 and 400 cases.294
The problem with the Commission's backlog is not so much
the number of cases awaiting decision as it is the length. of time
the cases are on review. Of the cases pending on September 2,
1980, half had beer on review before the Commission for more
than two years.9 Moreover, the length of time from the filing of
the notice of contest was even longer; nearly ten percent of the
cases had been in the adjudicatory process for five years or longer.
In one case the notice of contest had been filed ninety-two months
earlier.2 9 Because the filing of a notice of contest stays a cited em-
ployer's abatement requirement, employees of employers ulti-
mately found in violation will be deprived of protection under the
Act for more than seven years. If the cases are appealed, the delay
will be even longer.
289. [1975] 5 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 593.
290. See Francisco Tower Serv., Inc., 3 OSHC 1952, [1975-1976] OSHD (CCH) 1
20,401 (1976).
291. [1977] 7 OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 346.
292. According to Chairman Cleary, former Commissioner Moran's numerous direc-
tions for review "almost crippled" the Commission. [1980] 9 OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
(BNA) 949.
293. See note 291 supra.
294. On September 30, 1977, the backlog was 413 cases. [1977] 7 Occup. SAFETY &
HEALTH REP. (BNA) 829. By September 30, 1978, the backlog was down to 325 cases, [1978]
8 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH RE'. (BNA) 830, but by March 7, 1980, it was up to 403 cases.
OSHRC, CASES PENDING WTH THE COMMISSIONERS (Mar. 7, 1980). As of September 2, 1980,
368 cases were pending. OSHRC, CASES PENDING WrrH THE COMMISSIONERS (Sept. 2, 1980).
By September 30, 1980, the backlog was 338 cases. OSHRC News Release 80-33 (Oct. 15,
1980).
295. OSHRC, CASES PENDING WITH THE COMMISSIONERS (Sept. 2, 1980). Of the 368
cases on review, 183 had been pending for more than two years.
296. Id. According to Commissioner Barnako, the average case takes four years to go




2. The Commission's Efforts to Reduce Its Docket
(a) Procedural Prerequisites
An ALJ's determination may be directed for review by any
member of the Commission within thirty days of the date of the
decision.2" Such review can be brought about by the filing of a
petition for discretionary review (PDR) by an aggrieved party or
by a Commission member acting on his own. Since 1977 the Com-
mission has attempted to limit both avenues of review.
Although the Act does not specifically provide for PDRs, they
have been a part of the Commission's Rules of Procedure since
1972.298 The original rule did not require that the PDR state spe-
cific grounds for relief. The filing of a PDR merely called attention
to an alleged error. Upon review, all issues would be examined.
In January, 1977, however, the Commission adopted rule
91a,219 which provided, among other things, that a PDR may be
filed only upon one or more of the following grounds: (1) a finding
of material fact is not supported by the preponderance of the evi-
dence; (2) a decision by an ALJ is contrary to the law or to the
rules or decisions of the Commission; (3) the determination in-
volves a substantial question of law, policy, or abuse of discretion;
or (4) a prejudicial procedural error occurred.300 Another subpart
of the rule limited review to questions actually raised in the
PDR.5 0 1
The importance to an aggrieved party of filing a PDR was
demonstrated in Keystone Roofing Co. v. OSHRC.302 Relying on
the language of section 11(a), which states that "[n]o objection
that has not been urged before the Commission shall be considered
by the court,"303 the Third Circuit in Keystone Roofing held that
297. Occupational Safety & Health Act, § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1976).
298. Commission's Rules of Procedure, Rule 91, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91 (1972).
299. Commission's Rules of Procedure, Rule 91a, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91a (1977). An
amendment of the Commission's rules, which became effective in 1980, renumbered rule 91a
to rule 92. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,105 (1979).
300. Commission's Rules of Procedure, Rule 91a(b)(1)-(4), 29 C.F.R. § 91a(b)(1)-(4)
(1977). This rule has been given implicit congressional approval. When Congress enacted the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (Supp. 1 1978), it specif-
ically provided for the filing of PDRs before the Mine Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion and limited the available grounds to those set out in rule 91a(b)(1)-(4). 30 U.S.C. §
823(d)(2)(A)(ii) (1976).
301. Commission's Rules of Procedure, Rule 91a(c), 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91a(c) (1977).
302. 539 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1976). Accord, McGowan v. Marshall, 604 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.
1979).
303. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
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an employer's failure to file a PDR precluded judicial review. The
consequence of failing to file a PDR is now expressed in the 1980
amendment to rule 91(a). s°
The 1977 amendments to the Commission's Rules of Proce-
dure also limited the grounds upon which a member could order
review on his own motion. Rule 91a(c) precluded Commission re-
view of issues that had not been raised before the ALJ.30 5 Rule
91a(e) further limited review to those cases involving "novel ques-
tions of law or policy or questions involving conflict in administra-
tive law judges' decisions."306
A final procedural prerequisite to Commission review is the
filing of briefs before the Commission. In some cases in which
briefs were not filed, the direction for review has been vacated and
the ALJ's decision affirmed-even when review was ordered as a
result of the aggrieved party filing a PDR.30 7 Although this policy
was upheld by the Fifth Circuit,3 0 8 it is formalistic and burden-
some.309 Moreover, Commissioner Cottine has criticized the Com-
mission for finding a lack of "compelling public interest" in almost
every case in which no brief has been filed.310
304. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91(a) (1980).
305. The requirement that all issues must be raised before the ALJ is now embodied
in rule 92(d), which provides in pertinent part: "Except in extraordinary circumstances, the
Commission's power to review is limited to issues of law or fact raised by the parties in the
proceedings below." 29 C.F.R. § 2200.92(d) (1980).
306. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91a(e) (1977). Prior Commission decisions had already denied
review in cases in which no PDR was filed unless a "compelling public interest" or a "novel
question of law" existed. See Sletten Constr. Co., 4 OSHC 1403, [1976-1977] OSHD (CCH)
20,850 (1976); Water Works Install. Corp., 4 OSHC 1339, [1976-1977] OSHD (CCH) 1 20,780
(1976). Under the 1980 amendments, the requirements originally contained in rule 91a(e)
are now a part of rule 92(d).
307. Compare Prestressed Systems, Inc., 8 OSHC 1972, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 24,697
(employer fied "general" PDR but no brief), and Die-Underhill, a Joint Venture, 4 OSHC
1146, [1975-1976] OSHD (CCH) 20,509 (1976) (review ordered on different issue than that
raised in the PDR), with Hartwell Excavation Co., 4 OSHC 1263, [1976-1977] OSHD (CCH)
1 20,727 (1976), and Ace Window Cleaning Co., 4 OSHC 1230, [1975-1976] OSHD (CCH) 1
20,668 (1976) (review ordered by Commissioner sua sponte). See also PPG Indus., 8 OSHC
2003, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 24,733 (Commission vacated sua sponte direction for review,
even though the employer fied a 32 page brief, because the ALJ's finding that the violation
was de minimis made the employer "not an aggrieved party"). Id.
308. McGowan v. Marshall, 604 F.2d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 1979).
309. "While it may be reasonable to require that some formal objection to an ALJ's
decision be made before review is ordered, it is an inordinate burden to demand the plead-
ing of precise exceptions and comprehensive briefs as a precondition to Commission re-
view." M. RoTHSTRmN, supra note 29, at 429 (emphasis in original).
310. O.E.C. Corp., 8 OSHC 1257, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 1 24,480 (Cottine, Comm'r, dis-
senting); Keco Indus., Inc., 7 OSHC 2048, [1979] OSHD (CCH) 1 24,117 (Cottine, Comm'r,
dissenting) (involving validity of OSHA search warrants).
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(b) Reorganization of Personnel
Beginning in August, 1979, the personal legal ktaff of each
Commissioner was reduced from sixteen to six attorneys, and the
remaining attorneys and support staff were reassigned to the Office
of the General Counsel. The General Counsel was given the added
responsibility of drafting decisions for consideration by the Com-
missioners and their staffs. Although Commission Chairman Cleary
has asserted that the reorganization helped to decrease the backlog
of cases, 11 the data is inconclusive.312
(c) Simplified Proceedings
Commission Chairman Cleary has long advocated the use of
simplified proceedings that would save time and expense for par-
ties appearing before the Commission.3 13 It was not until March 1,
1980, however, that the Commission implemented optional simpli-
fied proceedings for a one year trial period. 1"
No pleadings, motions' 15 discovery,/x or interlocutory ap-
peals117 are permitted under simplified proceedings. If the issues
cannot be resolved at a mandatory pretrial conferences 18 a hearing
will be conducted in accordance with the APA.' 1' The Federal
Rules of Evidence will not apply, however.2 0 An official transcript
is prepared,"31 and post-hearing written arguments are permit-
ted.2 The ALJ issues a written decision, which is reviewable in
the same manner as all other cases."2
Although simplified proceedings may be requested by any
party,"' an objection by any party prevents the use of simplified
311. See OSHRC News Release 80-33 (Oct. 15, 1980) (noting increased case produc-
tion in fiscal year 1980). See also Couric, supra note 272.
312. See notes 330-44 infra and accompanying text.
313. See Cleary, Pleading and Practice Before the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, 24 LAB. L.J. 779, 787 (1973).
314. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,106 (1979). The rules for simplified proceedings appear at 29
C.F.R. J§ 2200.200-.211 (1980) and correspond to rules 200-211 of the Commission's Rules
of Procedure.
315. Commission's Rules of Procedure, Rule 204.
316. Id. at Rule 209.
317. Id. at Rule 210.
318. Id. at Rule 206(b).
319. Id. at Rule 206(c).
320. Id. at Rule 206(c)(1).
321. Id. at Rule 207.
322. Id. at Rule 206(c)(2).
323. Id. at Rule 208.
324. Id. at Rule 203(a)(1).
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proceedings.32 5 In addition, simplified proceedings are restricted to
certain types of cases. They may not be used in section 5(a)(1)
cases or in cases alleging violation of any health, noise, ventilation,
or radiation standard. 26
According to Commission officials, simplified proceedings have
thus far been a disappointment.32 7 In the first three months of the
experiment, requests for simplified proceedings were received in
only twenty-two percent of eligible cases-a total of 262 re-
quests.328 All but one of the requests were filed by employers, and
the Secretary objected to the requests in 101 cases. 3 29 Furthermore,
all but one of the cases in which no objection was filed were set-
tled.330 The high settlement rate suggests that settlement probably
would have occurred in any event.
It is unlikely that optional simplified proceedings will have a
noticeable impact on Commission adjudication. While at one time
simplified proceedings may have alleviated the burden placed on
employers cited for trivial matters, OSHA enforcement and adjudi-
cation is now increasingly technical and complex. In short, simpli-
fied proceedings is an idea whose time has come-and gone.
(d) Inflow and Outflow of Cases
The Commission's backlog results from more cases coming
into the adjudicatory system than are leaving it. Some mention al-
ready has been made of the Commission's attempts to expedite
decisionmakinge l and to limit the intake of cases. 3 2 A review of
some statistics may serve to illustrate the nature of the problem.
Table A indicates a sharp increase in the number of notices of
contest being filed. This increase, however, has been offset by an
increase in the settlement rate. While more settlements mean some
added administrative burdens, the number of cases decided each
325. Id. at Rule 203(b)(2)-(4).
326. Id. at Rule 202.
327. See [1980] 10 Occup. SAmn & HnmxTH REP. (BNA) 200.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. Of the 161 requests not objected to by the Secretary, 105 were granted. The
others were denied by the Commission because of ineligibility, untimeliness, or other rea-
sons. [1980] EMPL. SAmTY & HnsATH GumD (CCH) No. 480, at 11.
331. See notes 311-30 supra and accompanying text.
332. For a discussion of the procedural prerequisites to Commission review, see notes
297-310 supra and accompanying text.
333. All settlements must be in accord with the Commission's requirements and must
be approved by the Commission. See, e.g., IMC Chem. Group, Inc., 6 OSHC 2075, [1978]
OSHD (CCH) 123,149, rev'd, 9 OSHC 1031, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 1 24,990; Dawson Bros., 1
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year by ALJs has remained about the same.
TABLE A33
Commission Case Load, FY 1973-1980
Notices of Total

































following table shows the number of decisions of the
OSHC 1024, [1971-1973] OSHD (CCH) 1 15,039 (1972).
334. Tables A-E are based on unpublished statistics requested by the author from the
Commission's Office of Information, October, 1980.
335. The Commission's figures of notices of contest are considerably higher than
figures published by OSHA. See Table 4, supra note 278. Neither agency has been able to
explain the discrepancy. One possible explanation is that the Commission counts contested
petitions for modification of abatement as notices of contest, while OSHA does not.
336. "Total dispositions" is the sum of settlements plus ALJ decisions. Because the
disposition of a case is often not made in the same year as the notice of contest, it is not
appropriate to compare these figures on a yearly basis. Nevertheless, in theory, the total
notices of contest minus the total dispositions equals the backlog of cases at the ALJ level
Using the Commission's notice of contest figures, this would (theoretically) total 4513 cases
through fiscal year 1980. Using the OSHA notice of contest figures, this would (theoreti-
cally) total 1361 cases through the end of fiscal year 1979. According to Chief ALJ Paul
Tenney, the actual A.J "case inventory"-backlog-as of October 21, 1980, was 2470. In
addition, there were about 100 cases awaiting disposition of the Commission's Executive
Secretary.
337. "Settlements" encompasses all cases that did not reach a hearing, including uni-
lateral withdrawals by either side.
338. Beginning in 1977, the start of the fiscal year was changed from July 1st to Octo-
ber 1st, thus necessitating a "transition quarter."
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Table B
Productivity of ALJs, FY 1974-1980
Average Number of
FY33 AL Decisions ALs' °  Decisions per ALU
1974 775 38 20.4
1975 869 37 23.5
1976 930 44 19.8
1977 723 44 16.4
1978 576 43 13.4
1979 639 47 13.6
1980 581 46 12.6
Table B indicates a decline in the number of decisions per ALJ in
the last three years, perhaps as a result of the increased complexity
of OSHA cases. Although the energy of ALJs is expended to vary-
ing degrees in nonhearing cases, the Commission's ALJs averaged
only about one full decision per month in fiscal year 1980.
As shown in Table C, there has been a dramatic decline in the
number and percentage of cases directed for review.
Table C
Directions for Review, FY 1973-1980
FY ALJ Decisions Directions for Review Percent
1973 456 304 66.7
1974 775 313 40.4
1975 869 369 42.5
1976 930 683 73.4
Transition
Quarter 214 159 74.3
1977 723 408 56.4
1978 576 147 25.5
1979 639 149 23.3
1980 581 136 23.4
The large number of cases directed for review in fiscal 1976, the
transition quarter, and fiscal year 1977 are the result of former
Commissioner Moran's policy of directing numerous cases for re-
view simply to raise the issue of whether the Commission should
have discontinued the publication of decisions in an official re-
porter.3 1 Thus, it is more meaningful to compare fiscal years 1973-
1975 with fiscal years 1978-1980, during which the number of cases
339. For purposes of this Table, neither fiscal year 1973 nor the transition quarter are
included.
340. These figures represent the number of AUJs at the end of the first quarter of the
fiscal year.
341. See M. RomSTE, supra note 29, at § 465.
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directed for review has been reduced by over half.
The propensity of each Commission member to direct review
is indicated in Table D. Commissioner Barnako and Chairman
Cleary decreased their total directions for review by about one-half
from 1978 to 1979, and even more drastically from 1979 to 1980. At
the present rate, fewer than 100 cases will have been directed for
review in 1980, with two-thirds of the -cases directed by Commis-
sioner Cottine.
Table D
Directions for Review by Commissioner,
CY 1978-1980
Cleary Barnako Cottine
CY 1978 Sua Sponte 4 0 20
PDRs 54 39 24
Total 58 39 44
CY 1979 Sue Sponte 12 2 16
PDRs 19 17 46
Total 31 19 62
CY 1980 Sua Sponte 0 3 8
(Jan.- PDRs 8 9 37
Sept.) Total 8 12 45
Table E shows the number of Commission decisions for each
fiscal year.
Table E











According to the Commission, the marked increase in decisions
from fiscal year 1979 to fiscal year 1980 demonstrates that the 1979
reorganization of the Commission has been a success.u 2 Neverthe-
342. See OSHRC News Release, supra note 311.
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less, disregarding fiscal year 1973 (when the Commission was still
"gearing up") and fiscal year 1976, the transition quarter, and
fiscal year 1977 (when large numbers of former Commissioner Mo-
ran's directions for review were simply vacated), the Commission
issued an average of 212 decisions per year from fiscal year 1974
through fiscal year 1979. Therefore, fiscal year 1980, with its 221
decisions, was about an average year. Only the fact that fiscal year
1979 was the least productive year since 1973 made fiscal year 1980
seem so productive.
As a final note, in the last three years the number of Commis-
sion decisions that are actually remands to an ALJ has increased
substantially. In 1978 remands accounted for only 19.9% of Com-
mission decisions-31 of 156. In 1979, however, remands accounted
for 29.6% of Commission decisions-42 of 142-and in the first
nine months of 1980, remands made up 32.9% of Commission deci-
sions-57 of 173. Even though, for statistical purposes, these cases
are considered Commission "decisions," they remain within the
Commission's adjudicatory system and will require additional time
and resources to conclude.34
As already noted, the Commission has reduced substantially
the number of cases being directed for review and may not address
the merits of cases directed for review if the aggrieved party does
not file a brief.3" It is unlikely, however, that the Commission can
achieve much more of an "inflow" reduction without neglecting its
statutory responsibility. Accordingly, the Commission should re-
consider whether to continue reducing inflow in attempting to re-
343. The most important statistic is the number of Commission final orders, which
consists of the number of decisions minus the number of remands. Meaningful progress has
been made only if the number of final orders greatly exceeds the number of directions for
review in a given year. In other words, if all of the cases now pending before the Commission
were remanded to the ALJs, the backlog would be eliminated, but in reality the delays in
adjudication would simply shift to a different level within the Commission. Fiscal years 1979
and 1980 were the only years in which Commission decisions exceeded directions for review.
Only in fiscal year 1980 was the number of Commission final orders greater than the number
of directions for review. Of the 221 decisions in fiscal year 1980, there were 64 remands, for a
total of final orders of 157-only 21 more than the number of directions for review. In com-
puting the number of decisions issued, the Commission excludes "directions for review and
orders," but includes interlocutory appeals, and counts consolidated cases as the number of
docket numbers disposed of. On balance, this computation method tends to overstate the
number of "decisions."
Commissioner Cottine has criticized the Commission's new affinity to remand cases
needlessly, simply as a means of reducing the Commission's own caseload. See J.L. Foti
Constr. Co., 8 OSHC 1666, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 24,572 (Cottine, Comm'r, concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
344. See notes 307-10 supra and accompanying text.
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duce its backlog. The statistics also reveal that despite the good
faith and best efforts of the Commission, case productivity has re-
mained about the same over the past few years." 5 Consequently
the only solution appears to be some major institutional changes to
accelerate the final disposition of cases.
3. Proposed Administrative Reforms
(a) Case Priorities
The impact that adjudicative delays have upon employee ex-
posure to hazards varies greatly from case to case. In some cases,
each day without abatement heightens the risk of occupational in-
jury or illness. In other cases, a prolonged adjudication has little or
no deleterious impact on employee safety and health. Unfortu-
nately, the Commission has taken no meaningful steps to identify
the cases in which a prompt decision is essential in order to give
those cases first priority.3 6
The Commission should delegate to its Executive Secretary
and Chief ALJ the responsibility for identifying and giving highest
priority in assignment of cases to ALJs to cases involving health
hazards, durational violations,37 safety violations of high grav-
ity,3 4 8 and actions for failure to abate. Lowest priority should be
given to violations of low gravity, transitory violations,4' and pen-
345. It may well be that because of the increased complexity of OSHA cases, see note
288 supra and accompanying text, the Commission has had to work much harder just to
decide the same number of cases. The problem of complexity, however, promises to be even
more pronounced in the future.
346. Commission's Rules of Procedure, Rule 101, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.101 (1980), provides
for expedited proceedings in all actions involving petitions for modification of abatement
(PMAs) and in other cases in which expedited proceedings are ordered by any Commis-
sioner in response to a motion by any party or on the Commissioner's own motion. The rule
has proven ineffective in the few cases in which it has been applied. Even if this procedure
were effective, however, it would primarily expedite the small percentage of cases on review
before the Commission, and would not facilitate case assignments to or hearings by the
ALJs.
347. A durational violation continues for a limited period of time and then is termi-
nated by a change in working conditions. Durational violations are common in the construc-
tion industry. Some examples are violations for unshored trenches and for unguarded pe-
rimeters at a building construction site. See M. RoTHSTmN, supra note 29, at § 291.
348. Gravity is composed of the following factors: (1) the likelihood of an injury result-
ing from the violation; (2) the severity of a resultant injury, and (3) the extent to which the
standard, has been violated (the amount of employee exposure-both in terms of number of
employees and duration). Baltz Bros. Packing, 1 OSHC 118, [1971-1973] OSHD (CCH) 1
15,464 (1973).
349. A transitory violation is short-lived and usually self-abating, such as a crane con-
tacting an overhead power line and an industrial explosion. See M. RoTHSTFJN, supra note
29, at § 291.
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alty-only contests.3 50 A similar policy should be adopted by the
Commission with respect to cases directed for review.
In deciding petitions for modification of abatement (PMAs), 35 1
mootness is a common problem. Frequently the extension sought
in the petition will have passed before the case is decided. 2  One
possible administrative solution would be to assign, on a rotating
basis, one ALJ in each regional office to hear all PMAs.
(b) Standard of Review
The Commission has the ultimate responsibility for making
findings of fact in contested cases. 53 Consequently, the Commis-
sion is authorized to reject an AL's decision that it considers con-
trary to the preponderance of the evidence.3 " The Commission
gives deference to the AUJ only on the issue of witnesses' credibil-
ity,3 55 and even in this area the Commission has not always
adopted the determinations of an ALJ.5  If the AL's findings of
fact are rejected, the Commission may supplement the record with
its own findings of fact.357
A 1979 study of 129 final Commission decisions3 58 found that
in fifty-four of the decisions, or 41.9%, a controversy had existed
as to the accuracy of the ALJ's findings of fact. This statistic sug-
gests that too much of the Commission's energy and resources may
be spent in unnecessary reweighing of the factual record.
The Commission has the authority "to develop its own princi-
ples for determining the sufficiency of evidence, which can be used
350. See generally M. Ro'rsTm, supra note 29, at § 266.
351. PMAs are already decided on an expedited basis. See note 346 supra.
352. See generally M. RoTHsTmN, supra note 29, at §§ 290, 292.
353. Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
903 (1976). See generally Cleary, Some Aspects of Agency Review of Initial Decisions of
Administrative Law Judges, 31 LAB. L.J. 531 (1980).
354. General Dynamics Corp., 6 OSHC 1753, [1978] OSHD (CCH) 22,873, aff'd on
other grounds, 599 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1979); Champlin Petroleum Co., 5 OSHC 1601, [1977-
1978] OSHD (CCH) 1 21,951 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 593 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1979).
355. See Okland Constr. Co., 3 OSHC 2023, [1975-1976] OSHD (CCH) 1 20,441 (1976).
356. C. Kaufman, Inc., 6 OSHC 1295, [1977-1978] OSHD (CCH) 1 22,481 (1978); J.D.
Blum Constr. Co., 4 OSHC 1255, [1976-1977] OSHD (CCH) 1 20,735 (1976). In General
Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1979), however, the First Circuit cau-
tioned the Commission that "the ALJ's decision to give or deny credit to a particular wit-
ness' testimony should not be reversed absent an adequate explanation of the grounds for
the reviewing body's source of disagreement with the AU." Id. at 463.
357. Hidden Valley Corp., 1 OSAHRC 62, 1 OSHC 1005, [1971-1973] OSHD (CCH) 1
15,035 (1972).
358. Cases remanded to the ALJ were excluded.
[Vol. 34:71
OSHA REVIEW
to overrule decisions of an ALJ who applies conflicting rules. ' ' as5
This developmental authority extends to the standard of review by
which the Commission evaluates the factual findings of ALJs.
Much of the responsibility for excessive reevaluation of the record
lies in the Commission's use of the "preponderance of evidence"
test. Consequently, the Commission should consider adopting the
"clearly erroneous" rule with respect to evidentiary matters that is
embodied in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 52(a) provides that in nonjury cases "findings of fact shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous." The clearly erroneous rule
effectively makes the trial court's findings of fact presumptively
valid and places the burden of convincing the appellate court oth-
erwise on the petitioning party.3 6 0 A finding is clearly erroneous
when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed. '" 3 61
Adopting the clearly erroneous rule would allow the Commis-
sion to confront the legal issues in cases without spending undue
time reweighing the facts. At the same time, the clearly erroneous
standard is not overly deferential to the initial finder of facts; 62
therefore, the Commission would have the flexibility to correct any
mistakes made by the ALJs.
(c) Limited Review Period
Much of the delay that characterizes Commission decision-
making may be attributed to the fact that in complex and contro-
versial cases the Commissioners seldom reach agreement.36 3 The
359. A.E. Burgess Leather Co. v. OSHRC, 576 F.2d 948, 951 (1st Cir. 1978). Accord,
National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OSHRC, 607 F.2d 311, 316 (9th Cir. 1979); Usery v.
Hermitage Concrete Pipe Co., 584 F.2d 127, 134 (6th Cir. 1978).
360. See 9 C. WmGHT & A. MixR, FEDERAL PRACTE AND PROCEDURE § 2585 (1971).
361. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
362. By comparison, under the substantial evidence rule, courts "are not at liberty to
draw an inference different from the one drawn by the [Commission], even though it may
seem more plausible and reasonable to us." National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. OSHRC,
607 F.2d 311, 316 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting NLRB v. Millmen & Cabinet Makers Union,
Local 550, 367 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1966)).
363. The Commission's various interpretations of the components of a "repeated viola-
tion" illustrate the agency's inability to resolve an issue. The Commission's decision on the
issue in George Hyman Constr. Co., 5 OSHC 1318, [1977-1978] OSHD (CCH) 1 21,774
(1977), afl'd, 582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978), was a three-way split. There was no consensus
opinion on the definition until 1979, when Potlatch Corp., 7 OSHC 1061, [1979] OSHD
(CCH) 1 23,294, was decided. In the interim, the Commission and the ALJs avoided the
controversy by holding that whenever the penalty involved was $1000 or less (the maximum
for a nonrepeated violation), it was irrelevant whether the violation was repeated. See, e.g.,
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final outcome is often further delayed because a high percentage of
these cases are ultimately decided by the courts of appeals. 64 In
addition, appellate review may dilute the values 5 of the Commis-
sion's decision.3 "
The Commission could expedite the review process by adopt-
ing a rule that would require it to decide cases within one year.
Under such a rule, a case that remains undecided after a year
would be vacated, and the ALJ's determination would be affirmed;
however, the decision would not have precedential value. The rule
would also provide that, after a majority of the Commission had
agreed on the disposition of a case, the remaining member would
have thirty days in which to prepare a separate opinion. Conse-
quently, a single member could not delay the proceedings in the
face of a disposition by the majority until the one year period had
elapsed. The Supreme Court, except in rare instances, decides
cases in a single term. The Commission should act in a similar
fashion.
4. Proposed Statutory Amendments
(a) Expanding the Commission
Congress should amend section 12 of the Act to expand the
Commission from three members who serve staggered six-year
terms to five members who serve staggered five-year terms. Under
the amendment, three-member panels would be authorized to de-
cide cases, with the vote of two members needed to direct a case
for review.
The proposed amendment would expedite case handling in
several ways. First, with three-member panels authorized to decide
cases, the Commission's backlog would be decreased simply be-
National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 6 OSHC 1680, [1978] OSHD (CCH) 1 22,808, a/f'd on
other grounds, 607 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1979); F.H. Sparks of Md., Inc., 6 OSHC 1356, [1978]
OSHD (CCH) 1 22,543. Fortunately, this procedure is no longer followed. See Leone Indus.,
Inc., 8 OSHC 2222, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 1 24,933.
364. See Rothstein, supra note 98, at 610-14.
365. According to attorney Scott Railton, "[m]ost people look at the review commis-
sion as a way station to the court of appeals." Couric, supra note 272, at col. 4. Nevertheless,
the courts of appeals are more likely to affirm violations than is the Commission. See Roth-
stein, supra note 98, at 615.
366. In some cases, even after a protracted time on review, the Commissioners are
unable to reach agreement. See, e.g., Samson Paper Bag Co., 8 OSHC 1515, [1980] OSHD
(CCH) 1 24,555. Moreover, under the Commission's "Backlog Reduction Project" high prior-
ity was given to noncomplex and noncontroversial cases that could be decided quickly and
to "reconsideration remands" to the ALJ. See note 343 supra.
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cause more Commissioners would be available to decide cases.
Similar provisions have proved successful for the National Labor
Relations Board367 and the Mine Safety and Health Review Com-
mission.3 0 8 Important cases could still be decided by the entire
Commission.36 9 Second, the proposal, by requiring the vote of two
members to direct a case for review, would alleviate the current
"one dissenter" problem that is inherent in a system that allows
direction for review by a single member. Third, the proposal would
facilitate consistency in Commission decisionmaking. The Commis-
sion has frequently overruled existing precedent every two years as
a new third member has been appointed.37 0 Although under the
proposed amendment a new appointment would be made each
year, the impact of the new appointee on the Commission's policies
would be lessened. Finally, the proposal would permit Commission
decisionmaking during periods in which a vacancy exists on the
Commission.7 1 Often, the remaining two members have been una-
ble to agree on the outcome of cases. In many instances the Com-
mission has attempted to "dispose" of the case by affirming the
ALJ's decision by a divided vote. Some courts, 2 however, have
contended that the practice violates section 12(f)'s requirement
that "official action can be taken only on the affirmative vote of at
least two members. 3 73 Expanding the Commission to five mem-
bers would eliminate the problem in all but the most unusual of
circumstances.37 4
367. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
368. See 30 U.S.C. § 823(c) (Supp. II 1978).
369. By rule, members would be able to review all pending cases and determine those
that should be considered en banc.
370. See note 276 supra.
371. For example, Commissioner Van Namee's term expired in April, 1975; however,
Commissioner Barnako was not sworn in until August, 1975. Although Commissioner Mo-
ran's term expired in April, 1977, Commissioner Cottine was not sworn in until May, 1978.
372. Compare Shaw Constr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1976), and Cox
Bros. v. Secretary of Labor, 574 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1978), and Willamette Iron & Steel Co. v.
Secretary of Labor, 604 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1337 (1980) (Com-
mission decisions held invalid), with Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Prods. Co., 622 F.2d 1176
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W 3443 (Dec. 15, 1980), and George Hyman Constr.
Co. v. OSHRC, 582 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1978), and L.E. Myers Co. v. OSHRC, 589 F.2d 270
(7th Cir. 1978) (Commission decisions upheld).
373. 29 U.S.C. § 661(e) (1976) (emphasis added).
374. Conceivably, a panel with one vacancy could split an en banc decision two-to-two;
however, this possibility would arise very infrequently. A one-to-one decision of the present
Commission is much more likely. Moreover, the demonstrated predisposition of Commission
members makes it likely that numerous one-to-one situations could arise. See Rothstein,
supra note 98, at 622.
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Today's political climate makes it unpopular to expand a fed-
eral administrative body. A merger of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission with the Mine Safety and Health Re-
view Commission to form a new five-member tribunal should, how-
ever, be explored. In fact, a corresponding merger of OSHA with
the Mine Safety and Health Administration would not only in-
crease administrative and enforcement efficiency, but would also
eliminate troublesome overlaps in jurisdiction.3 7 5
(b) Discrimination Cases
Section 11(c)(1) of the Act prohibits retaliation in the form of
discrimination or discharge against an employee for the exercise of
any right "related to" the Act.3 76 Pursuant to section 11(c)(2), a
complaint must be filed with the Secretary within thirty days after
the occurrence of the alleged discrimination. After the complaint is
filed, the Secretary will usually conduct an investigation to deter-
mine the validity of the complaint. If the Secretary determines
that a complaint has merit, an attempt will be made to negotiate a
settlement. If the case cannot be settled, the Secretary may bring
an action in United States District Court on behalf of the com-
plainant to restrain violations and to obtain all appropriate relief,
including reinstatement and back pay.
In general, the courts have construed section 11(c) to provide
affected employees broad protection against discriminatory treat-
ment.3 77 Nevertheless, implementation of the Act's antidiscrimina-
tion provision has been seriously flawed. OSHA simply lacks the
personnel and resources needed to investigate adequately and liti-
gate employee complaints of discrimination. In fiscal year 1980,
OSHA received over 3500 discrimination complaints,78 which were
375. See 44 Fed. Reg. 22,827 (1979) (MSHA-OSHA agreement setting forth areas of
authority of each agency).
376. See generally M. ROmHsTmN, supra note 29, at §§ 187, 188.
377. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980) (upholding Secretary's
regulation interpreting § 11(c) as prohibiting discrimination against employees for refusing
to perform assigned tasks because of a reasonable apprehension of death or serious physical
harm and an inability to remedy the condition through resort to normal channels); Marshall
v. Intermountain Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 260 (1980) (refusing to apply state statute of limita-
tions to § 11(c) action); Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 469 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 611 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) (reporting health hazard to NIOSH protected under §
11(c)). But see Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, No. 78-2221 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1980), 8
OSHC 1648, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 1 24,596 (Secretary's regulation interpreting § 11(c) as
requiring that employees be compensated for time spent accompanying OSHA inspector
held invalid).
378. Although the fiscal year ends on September 30, the "end of the year" statistics
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handled by a staff of only fifty-nine. 7 During the same year, the
case backlog grew from 1559 to over 2100.380 More importantly, 446
cases found to be meritorious could not be filed in district court
because of inadequate resources." "
In light of the foregoing figures, the Secretary has pursued a
policy of using his office's resources only when there is no other
way to protect the complainant's rights. OSHA has promulgated a
regulation"2 that postpones action on a section 11(c) complaint
until arbitration proceedings are complete and any complaints
fied with other agencies or bodies are resolved. Furthermore,
OSHA will defer to the extra-agency results if (1) the other pro-
ceeding has dealt adequately with all factual issues; (2) the pro-
ceedings were fair, regular, and free of procedural infirmities; and
(3) the outcome of the proceeding was not clearly repugnant to the
purpose and policy of the Act.
OSHA's deferral policy-may be criticized as inconsistent with
the statute and with legislative intent.883 Moreover, the regulation
is arguably at variance with the procedures adopted under analo-
gous statutory schemes. Nevertheless, the courts have differed
on the legitimacy of both pre-arbitral and post-arbitral defer-
ence.es 5 In the related case of Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry-
dock Co. v. Marshall" a Virginia district court held that the Sec-
are as of August 29, 1980. As of that date 3548 complaints had been filed in fiscal year 1980.
Telephone interview with Chris Graybill of OSHA's Office of Information, October 1, 1980.
379. OSHA has 51 investigators and eight supervisors in its discrimination section. Id.
380. The backlog stood at 2117 as of August 29, 1980. Id.
381. This figure is as of August 29, 1980. Id.
382. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.18 (1980).
383. See M. RoTzT , aupra note 29, at § 188.
384. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37 (1971) (§ 5(2)(f) of Interstate
Commerce Act); United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351 (1971) (Federal
Maritime Wage Act of 1790); Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Fair
Labor Standards Act). Even the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), whose deferral
rule "inspired" OSHA, will not give deference to arbitration in matters of individual dis-
crimination under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§
151-168 (1976), or in cases arising under § 8(a)(4) of the NLRA for alleged discrimination
resulting from the filing of charges with or for testimony before the NLRB. See, e.g., Potter
Elec. Signal Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 209 (1978) (§ 8(a)(3)); Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, Inc.,
155 N.L.R.B. 52 (1965) (§ 8(a)(4)).
385. Compare Marshall v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980), and Bren-
nan v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 3 OSHC 1654, [1975-1976] OSHD (CCH) 1 20,136 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (post-arbitral deference rejected), with Brennan v. Pasco Steel Corp., No. 74-73 COL
(D. Md. 1975) (pre-arbitral deference upheld), and Marshall v. General Motors Corp., 6
OSHC 1200, [1978] OSHD (CCH) 1 22,532 (N.D. Ohio) (post-arbitral deference upheld).
386. 8 OSHC 1393, [1980] OSHD (CCH) 1 24,510 (E.D. Va.).
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retary could not defer to the judgment of the NLRB when a
section 11(c) complaint had been filed previously with the
Secretary.3
87
The Secretary's backlog of discrimination cases would be re-
duced if individual employees could bring section 11(c) actions in
district court. The Act, however, does not provide for private ac-
tions, and no implied right of action has been found. In Taylor v.
Brighton Corp.388 a group of employees allegedly discharged for re-
porting safety violations to OSHA brought an action against their
former employer in district court. Plaintiffs maintained that a pri-
vate right of action should be implied under section 11(c) of the
Act.3 9 The Secretary of Labor, appearing as amicus curiae, urged
the court to accept plaintiffs' argument that an implied remedy is
necessary to facilitate the objectives of the Act. The Sixth Circuit
declined the Secretary's invitation, however, and held that "[a]
private cause of action is simply inconsistent with the enforcement
plan provided by Congress. 3 90 The court was not persuaded by the
Secretary's argument that the administrative burdens that accom-
pany the disposition of section 11(c) claims justify a finding of a
private action. As the court stated:
The Secretary says he has neither the resources nor the personnel to handle
all § 11(c) complaints adequately. Moreover, he expects the number of such
complaints to increase dramatically due to his current campaign to alert em-
ployees of their OSHA rights. A private right of action should be implied, the
Secretary argues, because individual suits offer the only realistic hope of pro-
tecting employees from retaliatory discrimination.
The Secretary should address his arguments to Congress, not the
387. An employee's right under § 11(c) of the Act to engage in safety and health activ-
ity may also be protected under other laws, including § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. See, e.g., Jim
Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980). Both concerted activity and the
presence of a union contract may, however, be necessary for § 8(a)(1) protection. See NLRB
v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980). OSHA and the NLRB have entered into
a memorandum of understanding that gives OSHA primary responsibility for redressing em-
ployee discrimination based on the exercise of rights related to safety and health. 40 Fed.
Reg. 26,083 (1975). The stated reason for this agreement is that while employee rights are
explicitly protected by § 11 of OSHA, they are only implicitly protected by § 8 of the
NLRA. Id.
388. 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
389. The plaintiffs also sought to proceed under the federal Civil Rights Acts of 1866,
1871, and 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3), 2000e (1976). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the § 1985(3) action because the plaintiffs did not allege that the purported
conspiracy was motivated by class-based animus. 616 F.2d at 264-67. The remaining claims
based on alleged racial discrimination were not dismissed by the district court and therefore
were not addressed by the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 258 nn.4-5.





Congress has already provided an excellent antidiscrimination
procedure in the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.2 Section
105 of that Act authorizes "any miner, applicant for employment,
or representative of miners who believes that he has been dis-
charged, interfered with, or otherwise discriminated against" to file
a complaint with the Secretary within sixty days of the alleged vio-
lation.3  Upon receipt of the complaint, the Secretary forwards a
copy to the respondent and begins an investigation within fifteen
days.3 " The section provides that the Secretary shall, upon a de-
termination that the complaint has merit, apply to the Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission (MSHRC) for an order im-
mediately reinstating the miner pending a final resolution of the
complaint.39 5 A hearing is then held before the MSHRC on an ex-
pedited basis, with the complaining miner, applicant, or represen-
tative entitled to present additional evidence on his behalf.8" The
MSHRC has the authority to order all appropriate relief, including
reinstatement with back pay and interest.397
Within ninety days of the receipt of a complaint the Secretary
must notify the complainant of his determination of the validity of
the allegation.398 A complainant has the right to file an action on
his own behalf before the MSHRC if the Secretary determines that
the complaint is without merit. The action must be filed within
thirty days after .receipt of the Secretary's notice.3 " Private and
MSHA-initiated hearings are conducted in the same manner. Both
costs and attorney fees are awarded by MSHRC to a successful
private complainant.'0 All orders of MSHRC are subject to judi-
cial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit or for the circuit in which the violation is al-
leged to have occurred.'0 1
391. Id. at 263-64.
392. 30 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. H 1978).
393. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (Supp. H 1978). Section 11(c)(2) of the Act requires that the
complaint be filed within 30 days.
394. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (Supp. H 1978).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. For MSHRC construction of MSHA's anti-discrimination provision, see
Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Co., [1980] OSHD (CCH) 1 24,878.
398. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3) (Supp. H 1978).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. 30 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. II 1978).
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Because a meaningful antiretaliatory provision is essential to
effective enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act,'0 2 section 11(c) of the Act should be amended to adopt an-
tidiscrimination procedures similar to those provided in the Mine
Safety and Health Act. Such procedures would lessen the Secre-
tary's case load, remove a potential burden from the district
courts, provide more consistent decisionmaking, and expedite the
processing of claims. Furthermore, the procedures, by adopting the
substantial evidence rule, would accord due deference to the Com-
mission's technical expertise and experience.03
(c) Judicial Review
Section 11(a) of the Act provides that "any person adversely
affected or aggrieved by an order of the Commission"'' may seek
review by filing a petition for review in any United States court of
appeals for the circuit in which the alleged violation occurred, the
circuit in which the employer has its principal office, or in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Under section 11(b),
the Secretary may seek review only in the circuit in which the al-
leged violation occurred or in which the employer has its principal
place of business.
The courts of appeals have a "mixed" record in deciding
OSHA cases. In cases involving traditional administrative law is-
sues, such as exhaustion of remedies,'05 finality,40 and substantial
evidence, 07 courts have been relatively consistent and knowledgea-
ble in their decisions.'08 On the other hand, courts have sometimes
been unable to decide even simple OSHA cases promptly40' and
402. See generally Hancock, Employer Retaliation Can Chill Workers' Support for
OSHA, AFL-CIO AM. FEDRATiONIST, July, 1980, at 13, 14.
403. Thus, judicial review would be facilitated. See notes 365-67 supra and accompa-
nying text.
404. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1) (Supp. H 1978). In addition to employers and the Scretary,
petitions for judicial review have been filed by individual employees, Godwin v. OSHRC,
540 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1976), and by labor unions, UAW v. OSHRC, 557 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.
1977).
405. See, e.g., Marshall v. Able Contractors, Inc., 573 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 826 (1978); Keystone Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1976). See
also Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1070
(1972).
406. See, e.g., Robberson Steel Co. v. Marshall, 7 OSHC 1952 (10th Cir. 1978); Field-
crest Mills, Inc. v. OSHRC, 545 F.2d 1384 (4th Cir. 1976).
407. See, e.g., Usery v. Hermitage Concrete Pipe Co., 584 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1978);
National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
408. See generally Rothstein, supra note 98.
409. For example, in Usery v. Lacy, 628 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1980), the Commission
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have often been unclear about the Act's enforcement and adjudica-
tion system.410
In cases in which the Secretary and Commission have agreed
on the interpretation of a regulation or section of the Act, the
courts have accorded the interpretation the "normal degree of ju-
dicial deference."' 1 In many instances, however, the Secretary and
Commission have adopted different interpretations. The circuits
are divided on the question of which interpretation should be given
deference in such cases, although most courts have deferred to the
Commission." 2 Even when a court accords an interpretation some
degree of deference, however, there is no assurance that the inter-
pretation will be adopted. For example, in Kent Nowlin Construc-
tion Co. v. OSHRC4 ' the Tenth Circuit indicated that courts
should not "rubber stamp" administrative decisions that frustrate
the underlying congressional policy. 4"
Another "institutional" conflict concerns the issue of whether
the Commission may appear before the courts of appeals to defend
vacated a citation on the ground that the Secretary had failed to prove that the employer
was engaged in a business affecting commerce, as required by § 3(5) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §
652(5) (1976). Insofar as the case raised a single, uncomplicated issue that had already been
addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Godwin v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1976), the
Commission was clearly in error. The petition for review was filed on June 3, 1976, but the
court did not issue its decision until September 24, 1980-over four years later.
410. For example, in D. Federico Co. v. OSHRC, 558 F.2d 614 (1st Cir. 1977), the
court remarked that "we would strongly urge OSHRC [sic] to straighten up its own trenches
lest the employers it prosecutes be able to slip through unscathed." Id. at 617. In another
case, Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1979), the court remanded
a case to the Secretary to reevaluate the abatement requirement of a citation in light of the
employer's supervening revision of its work procedures. The court gave no indication of its
authority for remanding a case to the enforcement agency.
411. American Airlines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 578 F.2d 38, 39 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978).
Accord, Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. OSHRC, 567 F.2d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 1977); Western
Waterproofing Co. v. Marshall, 576 F.2d 139, 142 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 965(1978); Irvington Moore, Division of United States Natural Resources, Inc. v. OSHRC, 556
F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1977); Clarkson Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 531 F.2d 451, 457 (10th Cir.
1976).
412. Compare Brennan v. Southern Contractors Serv., 492 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir.
1974), and Brennan v. OSHRC (Kesler & Sons Constr. Co.), 513 F.2d 553, 554 (10th Cir.
1975) (deference given to Secretary), with Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'I, 540 F.2d 1283, 1289-90(6th Cir. 1976), and Brennan v. OSHRC (Ron M. Fiegen, Inc.), 513 F.2d 713, 715-16 (8th
Cir. 1975) (deference given to Commission).
413. 593 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
414. Id. at 371. The general rule is simply that "[t]he Commission's interpretations of
OSHA's provisions are entitled to deference where they are reasonable and consistent with
the Act's purposes." Central of Ga. R.R. v. OSHRC, 576 F.2d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1978). See
generally M. RoTHsmrs, supra note 29, at §§ 488-89.
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its orders.415 The Fourth'41 and Fifth 17 Circuits have held that the
Commission is a proper party; the Third418 and Ninth41' Circuits
have taken the opposite approach. In the most recent case, Mar-
shall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co.,420 the Third Circuit adopted
a restrictive approach, contending that "the Review Commission
was designed strictly as an independent adjudicator, with no
rulemaking authority.., no... policy role in administering the
Act, and accordingly, no right to independent representation in ju-
dicial review procedures before this court. '41
V. CONCLUSION
During the last ten years, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act has led to new scientific research, improved recordkeeping, and
greater public awareness of the problem of job-related injury and
illness. This substantial increase in occupational safety and health
information has confirmed Congress' wisdom in enacting a compre-
hensive national occupational safety and health statute. The per-
vasiveness, severity, and national scope of the problem and the in-
adequacy of private and state initiatives have underscored the
need for federal action. It is painfully clear, however, that OSHA
has far to go to reach its goal. The dramatic improvements in the
last four years in implementing OSHA have not established that
the Act is working, but only that it can work.
Critics of OSHA point to unsuccessful past programs, the
Act's expense, and the absence of data showing conclusive and sig-
nificant reductions in injury and illness rates as warranting major
structural changes and significant limitations on the Act's cover-
age. Nevertheless, prior disappointments do not diminish the ur-
415. In many respects, this issue focuses on whether the Commission is considered as
a traditional administrativi agency or as a-quasi-judicial body. See Moran, Parties to Pro-
ceedings in the Court of Appeals Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
15 B.C. INDus. & Comm. L. Rzv. 1089 (1974).
416. Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1267 (4th Cir. 1974).
417. Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 648 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976).
418. Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Prods. Co., 622 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
49 U.S.L.W. 3443 (Dec. 15, 1980).
419. Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974).
420. See Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Prods. Co., 622 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3443 (Dec. 15, 1980).
421. Id. at 1184. According to § 14 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 663 (1976), the Solicitor of
Labor is authorized to represent the Secretary in any civil litigation under OSHA, subject to
the direction and control of the Attorney General. Although the Commission is not explic-
itly mentioned in the section, if it were to appear before the courts of appeals, it would
probably also be subject to the direction and control of the Attorney General. It is uncertain
how conflict between the Commission and the Secretary should be resolved when both are
represented by the Attorney General.
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gent need to protect all workers, nor do concerns about expense
and inconvenience justify a sweeping reduction in the scope or goal
of the statute.
This Article has suggested several ways in which the OSHA
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication functions can be im-
proved. Most of these proposals can be implemented quickly and
with a minimum of administrative inconvenience. The list of pro-
posals is not meant to be all-inclusive; rather, it is simply intended
to illustrate the kinds of broad policy changes that are needed.
If the Act's lofty goal of ensuring workplace safety and health
is to be realized in the next ten years, there must be renewed com-
mitment on the part of Congress and renewed concern and cooper-
ation on the part of employers and employees. In short, OSHA
should not be abandoned, but can and must be made to work.

